MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

USMC

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 143 000177 00

MCWP 3-03

U.S. Marine Corps

Stability Operations

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

4 April 2018

CHANGE 1 to MCWP 3-03

Stability Operations

1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of all applicable and appropriate

terms, except those terms governed by higher authority. No other content has been affected.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSH

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Numbers:

Publication: 143 000177 00

Change: 143 000177 01

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

16 December 2016

FOREWORD

The Marine Corps will continue, with increasing frequency, to conduct activities in support of

stability operations. These operations will span the range of military operations, from peacetime

engagement, to limited contingencies and crisis response, to major operations and campaigns.

During periods of relative calm, combatant commanders will use Marine Corps operating forces,

either Marine air-ground task forces or other task-organized force packages, in support of our

national strategy of engagement. This aspect of our national strategy assists in building host nation

capacities, promotes democracy and the rule of law, and builds understanding of our cultures.

Beyond peacetime engagement, Marine Corps operating forces will participate in both limited

contingency and crisis response stability operations. The expeditionary nature of the Marine

Corps and its role as the nation’s force-in-readiness demands Marines prepare to conduct stability

operations of short or long duration. Participants working with Marines will come from many

organizations such as host nation personnel, various United States Government agencies,

multinational forces, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-03, Stability Operations, codifies tasks, planning

considerations, and other considerations for use by the Marine air-ground task force in stability

operations. It is a result of lessons learned through the development of the joint irregular warfare

capability based assessment and responds to the Department of Defense directive that distinguishes

irregular warfare from traditional warfare. Stability operations are one of a variety of steady-state

and surge Department of Defense irregular warfare and small wars activities and operations.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSH

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000177 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Overview

Fundamentals..............................................................................................................................................1-1

Stability Operations as a Core US Military Mission ..................................................................................1-3

Stability Operations Response Actions ......................................................................................................1-4

Providing Initial Response ...................................................................................................................1-4

Effecting Transformation.....................................................................................................................1-4

Fostering Stability ................................................................................................................................1-4

Marine Corps Approach to Stability Operations ........................................................................................1-5

Etymology............................................................................................................................................1-5

Aspects of Stability Operations............................................................................................................1-6

MAGTF Execution of Stability Operations .........................................................................................1-6

Stability Operations Tenets.........................................................................................................................1-7

Stability Operations Criteria.......................................................................................................................1-8

Chapter 2. Functions and Tasks

Functions.....................................................................................................................................................2-1

Tasks...........................................................................................................................................................2-2

Establish Civil Security........................................................................................................................2-3

Provide Humanitarian Assistance ........................................................................................................2-5

Support and/or Provide Restoration of Essential Services...................................................................2-6

Support Establishment of Civil Control...............................................................................................2-6

Support Economic and Infrastructure Development............................................................................2-8

Support to Governance.......................................................................................................................2-10

Chapter 3. Planning for Stability Operations

Unified Action ............................................................................................................................................3-1

Civil-Military Operations ...........................................................................................................................3-2

Integration of Information and Communication.........................................................................................3-3

Assessment .................................................................................................................................................3-3

Initial Assessment ................................................................................................................................3-4

Operational Assessment .......................................................................................................................3-4

Assessment Frameworks and Models ..................................................................................................3-4

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

iii

Transitions ..................................................................................................................................................3-7

Funding Stability Operations......................................................................................................................3-8

Legitimacy ..................................................................................................................................................3-8

Restraint......................................................................................................................................................3-9

Chapter 4. Maritime Stability Operations

Understanding Maritime Stability Operations............................................................................................4-1

Maritime Stability Operations: A Legal Understanding.............................................................................4-3

United States Code .....................................................................................................................................4-3

Sources of Instability in the Maritime Environment ..................................................................................4-4

Traditional State Challenges ................................................................................................................4-4

Terrorist Challenges.............................................................................................................................4-4

Transnational Crime and Piracy Challenges........................................................................................4-5

Natural Disasters ..................................................................................................................................4-5

Environmental Destruction ..................................................................................................................4-6

Illegal Seaborne Migration...................................................................................................................4-6

The United States Naval Service ................................................................................................................4-6

Maritime, Stability-Related Tasks..............................................................................................................4-7

Aid to Distressed Mariners Operations ................................................................................................4-7

Antipiracy Operations ..........................................................................................................................4-7

Arms Control........................................................................................................................................4-8

Counter Illicit Trafficking (Drugs, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Humans).....................................4-8

Counterpiracy.......................................................................................................................................4-8

Emergency Repair of Maritime Infrastructure.....................................................................................4-8

Exclusion Zone Enforcement...............................................................................................................4-8

Expeditionary Diving and Salvage.......................................................................................................4-9

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ..............................................................................................................4-9

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Operations .............................................................................4-9

Gas-Oil Platform ..................................................................................................................................4-9

Maritime Counterterrorism ..................................................................................................................4-9

Maritime Interception...........................................................................................................................4-9

Mine Countermeasures.........................................................................................................................4-9

Offshore Resource Protection ............................................................................................................4-10

Port Security.......................................................................................................................................4-10

Show of Force ....................................................................................................................................4-10

Vessel Escort......................................................................................................................................4-10

Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure.............................................................................................

..........4-11

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Appendices

A Strategic-Level Guidance and Policy............................................................................................. A-1

B Stability Assessment Framework ................................................................................................... B-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-1

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

FUNDAMENTALS

In 2005, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability,

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, established stability operations as a core

US military mission and directed the US forces to prepare to conduct these types of operations

with a level of proficiency equivalent to combat operations. In 2009, the directive was revised and

re-issued as Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations. This

instruction directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to be prepared to—

 “Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range

of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude

of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale,

long-duration.”

 “Support stability operations activities led by other [United States Government (USG)]

departments or agencies . . . , foreign governments and security forces, international

governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.”

 “Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential

services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance [HA] until

such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other [USG] agencies, foreign

governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations . . . .”

Stability operations are presently defined as “an overarching term encompassing various military

missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the continental United States [OCONUS] in

coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure

environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction,

and humanitarian relief” (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms). Stability operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, and

integration among military and nonmilitary organizations. These complementary civil-military

efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain the rule of law, support

economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity that enable the host

government to assume responsibility for civil administration. See appendix A for more

information on guidance and policy at the strategic level.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-2

Several aspects of stability operations deserve emphasis and explanation:

 Stability operations are an overarching term. Stability operations include many subordinate

missions, tasks, and activities. Stability-related activities include broad functions, such as

support to governance and stabilization, economic development, rule of law, civil security,

and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).

 Stability operations encompass various actions conducted outside of the continental United

States. The underlying premise of stability operations is that a stable world presents fewer

threats when compared to a world with pockets of instability. The aim of stability operations

is to remove the underlying source of instability and create opportunities for a safer and more

secure environment. While the focus of stability operations is OCONUS, these operations

often contribute indirectly to the defense and security of the United States.

 Stability operations are conducted in coordination with other instruments of national power.

Whole of government approaches (i.e., all pertinent USG departments and agencies) are

required in stability operations. Stability operations conducted in countries

with an US ambassador are conducted with ambassadorial (or deputy chief of mission)

coordination and approval. These various missions, tasks, and activities may involve

participation from a large number of USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental

organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), other nations, US

ambassadors, and multinational forces.

 Stability operations are conducted to maintain or to re-establish a safe and secure environment

and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and

humanitarian relief. This important dimension of stability operations acknowledges support to

maintain stability in some situations, while in others, to re-establish stability. Stability operations

align efforts to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction,

and humanitarian relief making them preventive, as well as responsive, to instability.

The term “stability operation” can be used in three different contexts. The term may refer to phase

four of the joint campaign construct: stabilize. The term may be used to describe a joint operation

or major campaign. The term may also be used to describe a series of activities conducted

simultaneously with other types of operations as described in, Irregular Warfare (IW), which

states that DOD stability operations may be included as one of a “variety of steady-state and surge

DOD activities and operations . . . that, in the context of IW [irregular warfare], involve

establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.”

In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to accomplish a task or mission.

Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, large-scale combat

anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations also enable a wide variety of

other operations. Examples of military operations to achieve stability include, but are not limited

to, civil support; FHA; recovery; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations;

countering weapons of mass destruction; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

consequence management; foreign internal defense; counterdrug operations; combating terrorism;

counterinsurgency (COIN); maritime interception operations; and security force assistance.

While stability operations are often considered in terms of actions ashore, they have a maritime

application as well. The maritime domain, which includes both the landward and seaward portions

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-3

of the littorals, connects the nations of the world by carrying 90 percent of the world’s trade and

two thirds of its petroleum. The maritime domain is the lifeline of the modern global economy,

which relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Marine Corps forces

have an important and enduring role in the conduct of stability operations in the littorals. Often

task-organized with US Navy and US Coast Guard forces, Marine Corps forces perform a variety

of missions associated with stability operations in the landward and seaward portions of the

maritime domain.

Most operational environments require the commander to conduct a variety of operations

simultaneously and sequentially. This is particularly evident in a campaign or operation where

combat occurs during several phases and stability operations may occur throughout the campaign

or operation. Commanders strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously

across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area.

STABILITY OPERATIONS AS A CORE US MILITARY MISSION

As a core US military mission, vice a lesser included mission of combat operations, stability

operations require Marine Corps operating forces to be organized and equipped to achieve a

level of proficiency that is equal to that of combat operations. In order to achieve that level of

proficiency, new capabilities may be required and the existing capacity for stability operations

may need to be increased. Stability operations may require innovative organizational approaches,

additional equipment sets, and revised training and educational programs. Marine Corps forces

will need to tailor force packages for greater synergy, while improving capabilities and increasing

capacity to support civil security and control, restore or provide essential services, repair critical

infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance.

The six phases of a joint campaign—shape the environment, deter the enemy, seize the initiative,

dominate the enemy, stabilize the environment, and enable civil authority—have stability

operations implications that are integral to the campaign. For example, lethal actions may

facilitate operations in the seize the initiative and dominate the enemy phases but create

insurmountable challenges for establishing stability in the enable civil authority phase. Planning and

executing both combat and stability operations as part of a joint campaign helps create conditions

necessary to enable civil authority, thus speeding the transition process. The significance of this

campaign phasing construct is that it describes the applicability of military capabilities more

broadly than simply defeating an adversary’s military forces. It gives greater visibility to

sustaining continuous forward operations, working with numerous and diverse partner

organizations, responding quickly to a variety of emergencies, conducting wide ranging and often

simultaneous activities, effectively dealing with changing operational situations, and quickly

transitioning from one mission to the next.

Stability operations can occur across the range of military operations and may include both

combat and noncombat activities. Both the Guidance for Employment of the Force and Joint

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-4

Strategic Capabilities Plan direct the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to include

stability operations as part of the theater campaign plan. Security force assistance, security

cooperation, and FHA are examples of noncombat stability activities that reinforce the strategic

principle that preventing conflict is as important as prevailing in combat.

STABILITY OPERATIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS

Stability operations have occurred with increasing frequency during the past 20 years in such

places as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Somalia, the Philippines, Haiti, and Afghanistan as well as on

the high seas in places like the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Adriatic Sea, and Caribbean Sea. As

these examples illustrate, stability operations are not limited to post-conflict applications and may

occur across the range of military operations. Stability operations response actions include

providing initial response, effecting transformation, and fostering stability activities. Depending on

the host nation (HN) stability situation, response actions may occur sequentially or individually.

Providing Initial Response

Initial response encompasses those tasks required to stabilize the operational environment in a

crisis. The initial response normally occurs during or directly after a conflict or crisis and the tasks

are aimed at providing a safe, secure environment and attending to the immediate essential service

needs of the local population. As the crisis evolves, the response force may transition focus to

transformational activities and activities that foster sustainability in an attempt to avert future

crises. The decision for the response force to continue efforts to alleviate underlying causes of

the crisis is political and will vary with the circumstances. As an expeditionary force in readiness,

the Marine Corps plans, trains, mans, and equips itself for crises response/limited contingency

operations. Its focus is on arrival, initial response, stabilization, and transition to follow-on forces.

The duration of the initial response phase can vary. It may be relatively brief, such as following a

natural disaster, or longer, such as following major conventional combat.

Effecting Transformation

Transformation represents a broad range of reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building

activities. It may or may not be associated with post-conflict operations and may occur in either

failed or failing states. The objective during transformation is to develop and build enduring

capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil security improves,

the focus expands to include development of legitimate governance, provision of essential

services, and stimulation of economic development. Concurrently, and as a result of the

expanded focus, stability force relationships develop and strengthen with HN counterparts

and with the local populace.

Fostering Stability

Fostering stability encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity building and

reconstruction activities to establish conditions enabling sustainable development. This phase

emphasizes capacity building with the goal of transitioning responsibility to HN leadership and

security forces.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-5

MARINE CORPS APPROACH TO STABILITY OPERATIONS

The Marine Corps has long understood, as part of its legacy, that stability operations are precisely

the type of operations that Marine Corps operating forces, along with other elements of the joint

force, will be required to conduct, perhaps with increasing regularity. Therefore, the Marine Corps

approach to stability operations is to broaden its understanding and application of stability

activities beyond just offensive and defensive operations.

Etymology

Stability operations are the latest in a series of terminology nuances in an effort to add clarity and

definition to the increasingly large number of tasks US forces are required to conduct. In the 1930s

and 1940s the Marine Corps referred to these types of operations as small wars. In the 1980s, this

term evolved into “other expeditionary operations” and ultimately into “operations other than war.”

These terminology changes were an attempt to move away from the focus on war, become more

politically acceptable to intergovernmental partners, and address the myriad of additional missions

being performed by US forces; such as, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations,

counterdrug, FHA, and others.

Also, in the 1980s, joint doctrine expanded in breath and scope and adopted the term “military

operations other than war” or “MOOTW” as the overarching term to describe military tasks that

cannot be characterized as conventional combat operations. The Marine Corps, in an effort to

support evolving joint doctrine, adopted this change.

New terms stability, security, transition, and reconstruction were implemented by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense in DODD 3000.05 dated 28 November 2005. This directive defined stability

operations as, “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to

conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” This directive also defined military

support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction as “Department of Defense activities

that support [US] Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition

operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing US interests.”

At almost the same time, the United Nations (UN) term “peacekeeping operations” underwent

its own metamorphosis based on experiences in the Balkans. The term “peacekeeping” proved

insufficient to describe the types of peace operations being conducted globally. As a result, the

terms “peace enforcement” and “peacemaking” were adopted by the DOD to describe actions

being conducted in support of UN missions. This new terminology construct required a new

umbrella term resulting in the term “peace operations” with peace enforcement, peacemaking,

and peace building falling underneath.

In the early 2000s it became clear that US forces alone could not successfully accomplish

the range of tasks required to achieve stability in failed and failing states and that a whole

of government solution was required. With the Department of State (DOS) in the lead, the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began using the term “stability

operations” to describe the range of actions necessary to assist failed and failing states. This

term was viewed as less warlike than “military operations other than war” and, more

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-6

appropriately, described the increased range of actions required by military forces in operations

across the range of military operations. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the

importance of the military contribution to stability operations functions and tasks.

Stability operations are discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations as various military missions,

tasks, and activities conducted outside the continental United States in coordination with other

instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief

and includes missions such as nation assistance, FHA, and peace operations.

Aspects of Stability Operations

Stability operations are one of the Marine air-ground task force’s (MAGTF’s) missions. As part of its

small wars legacy, Marine Corps operating forces have conducted these types of operations along

with other elements of the joint force and they will conduct and/or support stability operations with

increasing regularity in the future.

The Marine Corp’s understanding of stability operations is in consonance with the DODI 3000.05

and JP 3-07, Stability Operations, definitions. Per the definition, stability operations—

 Are OCONUS activities and as such, defense support of civil authorities is not considered a

stability operation.

 Require unified action to harmonize all instruments of national power as well as those of the

host nation.

 Are conducted to maintain or re-establish stability in a host nation.

 Include activities that provide for a safe and secure environment and provide essential

governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Certain characteristics that are typically associated with stability operations are as follows:

 Occur across the range of military operations.

 Occur in every phase of the joint campaign construct for major operations and campaigns.

 Are the primary military contribution to stabilization in order to protect and defend a

population; facilitate the personal security of the people; and, thereby, create a platform

for political, economic, and human security.

 Benefit from early transitions, which are preferable for an expeditionary force, but not

always possible.

 Require continuous assessment from the strategic to the tactical levels.

 Utilize civil-military operations (CMO) in a central integrating role in unified action.

 Integrate communication (narrative) as a force multiplier for the collective stability effort.

MAGTF Execution of Stability Operations

The MAGTF’s expeditionary nature lends itself to frequently executing stability operations. In

the case of disaster relief operations, MAGTF air and ground lift capabilities may be tasked to

deliver relief supplies. In this case, extensive coordination between the MAGTF and civilian

organizations is critical to mission success. The MAGTF staff must be able to competently

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-7

navigate the labyrinth of civilian organizations in order to succeed. Civil affairs Marines

on the command element staff are ideal to support such coordination efforts.

STABILITY OPERATIONS TENETS

The following tenets apply to the planning, coordination, and execution of stability operations:

 HN involvement. To the maximum extent possible, countries experiencing instability

must actively participate in defining objectives, conducting assessments, planning,

coordinating, and executing stability operations that lead to the resumption of their

authority and effective governance.

 Joint operations. Stability operations usually require unified action from across the Services to

re-establish security, perform interim governance functions, repair critical infrastructure, and

enable the early resumption of HN economic and governance activities. Each Service will

be employed in accordance with its capabilities and address instability in the air, land, and

sea domains.

 Assessment. Understanding the uniqueness of the operational environment and continually

updating information through assessment is vital to the planning and execution of stability

operations. It begins with a broad understanding of political, social, economic, cultural,

regional, and historical factors.

 Comprehensive approach. Stability operations generally include participation from a large

number of USG departments and agencies referred to as the interagency. Most important is

the DOS because stability operations are conducted with ambassadorial (or deputy chief of

mission) coordination and approval. Other potential partners outside the USG referred to as

the interorganization include IGOs, NGOs, other nations, and multinational forces. Achieving

unity of effort among many organizations and activities, some with incongruent interests,

requires early and continuous coordination and integration.

 Magnitude and duration may vary. Although mostly associated with actions following a major

campaign lasting years, a stability operation can include a crises response operation lasting only

a few days.

 Security. Establishing security is a key prerequisite for stability operations and activities

and may require a range of defensive and offensive actions to create a safe environment for

stability-related efforts.

 Transition lead responsibility. Since DOD has expeditionary capability and capacity in the

areas of command and control and logistics, it is often given the lead in certain aspects of

stability operations. However, early and continuous coordination and planning with the DOS

will better shape both the execution of the stability operation as well as assist in the transition to

the host nation. The responsibility for transition will normally be addressed by the DOS, UN,

coalition partners as well as the host nation.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

1-8

STABILITY OPERATIONS CRITERIA

A comprehensive understanding of what constitutes a stability operation is often difficult to

ascertain with the multitude of missions and activities. The following criteria, based on the joint

definition, that when met, determines whether an operation is or is not a stability operation. A

stability operation must—

 Be conducted OCONUS.

 Be conducted in coordination with USG agencies outside the DOD and or partner nations.

 Be purposed to achieve at least one of the following:

Maintain objective or sustain a safe and secure environment.

Provide essential government services.

Reconstruct emergency infrastructure.

Provide humanitarian relief.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-1

CHAPTER 2

FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

The missions assigned to Marine Corps operating forces during stability operations may vary

depending upon the security environment, the authority and responsibility of the forces, and

the presence and capacities of NGOs, IGOs, nonstate actors (threat, friendly, neutral) and other

non-DOD departments and agencies. In some cases, these actors will be well established before

stability operations begin. In others, Marine Corps operating forces will have to operate before

other actors can have a significant presence and may, in some cases, be expected to lead a

nonsecurity effort until other more appropriate organizations take responsibility for the task.

Marine Corps support to the range of stability-related tasks can take the form of individual

augmentation or logistics, communications, legal, engineering, or medical support. As with all

support-related tasks, the type of support (direct, close, mutual, or general) as well as the degree

of support must be specified by the establishing authority or agreed mutually by the supporting

and supported commanders.

FUNCTIONS

JP 3-07 identifies five stability operations functions used by joint force planners to guide the

planning and conducting of stability operations. Their principal purpose is to ensure that a

comprehensive plan is developed that includes all stability-related activities. These functions are—

 Security

 Humanitarian assistance

 Economic stabilization and infrastructure

 Rule of law

 Governance and participation

These functions were first codified in the DOS publication Guiding Principles for Stabilization

and Reconstruction. This publication provides a framework for stabilization efforts that stems

from the policies, doctrine, and training of civilian departments and agencies across both the

USG and foreign governments.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-2

TASKS

The Marine Corps recognizes six core stability tasks that flow directly from stability functions.

These stability tasks are—

 Establish civil security.

 Provide humanitarian assistance.

 Support and/or provide restoration of essential services.

 Support establishment of civil control.

 Support economic and infrastructure development.

 Support to governance.

The six core stability tasks and their numerous subtasks focus Marine Corps efforts toward desired

conditions. Normally, Marine Corps operating forces support stability operations in the initial phase

until adequate security is achieved and HN or other government agencies can perform their

established role. In other cases, such as a failed state, Marine Corps operating forces may be required

to participate in a broader range of tasks and participate before and/or beyond the initial phase.

The six core stability tasks are interrelated whereby achieving a specific objective or establishing

certain conditions often requires performing a combination of related tasks. For example, the tasks

required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace may require Marine Corps

operating forces to participate in ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and criminal elements,

demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order

and safety.

The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the

situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective HN government exists, Marine Corps

operating forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together, they restore stability and

order and may be required to reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In

this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a

worst-case scenario, the security environment is in chaos, and the state is in crisis or has failed

altogether. In this situation, Marine Corps and other forces focus on the core tasks that establish a

safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace.

Marine Corps forces may lead and/or support the execution of these core tasks. In some cases,

Marine Corps operating forces may lead a core task until the HN or other government agencies are

capable of performing their leadership role. Often this requires a level of security that allows

relative safety for those personnel.

All six core tasks have a security component ideally performed by Marine Corps operating forces.

However, Marines may provide other support (e.g., logistics, engineering) to enable the success of

civilian agencies and organizations.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-3

Establish Civil Security

Civil security is the provision of security for state entities and indigenous populations and

institutions, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure,

and stable environment helps obtain local support for the overall operation. As soon as the HN

security forces can perform this task, Marine Corps operating forces transition civil security

responsibilities to them. Within the security functional area, transformation tasks focus on

developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. Civil security helps set

conditions for enduring stability.

Marine Corps forces help establish civil security by performing a number of subordinate tasks.

During the initial response phase, Marine Corps operating forces may execute the tasks on their

own because the host nation lacks capability or the security situation prevents their involvement.

In the transformation phase and fostering sustainability phase, Marine Corps operating forces

transition to building partner capacity missions that improve the capability and capacity of HN

security forces.

Depending on the situation, establishing civil security may include seven subtasks.

Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements. Marine Corps operating

forces perform peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Peacekeeping missions may involve

monitoring, facilitating confidence building measures, and investigating alleged violations.

Peace enforcement missions may involve working with parties that have not agreed to end

hostilities and to compel compliance with sanctions or resolutions designed to maintain peace

and order. Marine Corps forces enforce cease fires with measures such as patrols, guard posts,

remote sensors, checkpoints, and possibly a focus on a buffer zone that separates belligerents.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may also be required to supervise

adversary disengagement, identify or neutralize adversaries, provide security for negotiations, and

build HN capacity.

Determine Disposition and Composition of National Armed and Intelligence Services. Host-nation

security forces may include military, police, border security, various infrastructure protection

forces, intelligence organizations, and nonstate security actors. Determining host-nation security

forces disposition and composition enable proper planning of stability operations and help determine

the level of effort needed in supporting the host-nation security forces.

Host nation military forces may include active duty or reserve component army, marine corps,

navy, air force, coast guard, or special operations forces. Units may be postured for territorial

defense, home guard functions, or expeditionary missions and are normally subordinate to a

ministry of defense.

Constabulary forces may be local, regional, and national police forces and fall under the ministries

of defense or interior. Normally, these forces focus on internal threats, law and order, and crime

prevention and response. Specialized units may address issues such as terrorism, narcotics,

organized crime, corruption, or human trafficking. Police forces are normally subordinate to the

primary civilian official in their jurisdiction (e.g., mayor, governor), with national police normally

subordinate to an interior minister. Police forces may have overlapping jurisdictions with other

security forces, including military units. Border security forces along the nation’s boundaries are

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-4

normally subordinate to the ministries of defense or interior. They may include customs and

immigration organizations, although these may fall under a different ministry.

A wide variety of infrastructure protection forces may exist. These forces have responsibility

for securing power facilities, refineries, shipyards, telecommunications sites, and other locations

and may be subordinate to the relevant ministries, regional or local governments, or to the

facility administrators.

One or more intelligence organizations may exist, reporting to the ministry of defense or interior,

a separate intelligence chief, or other organization. These organizations focus on foreign concerns,

domestic matters, or both.

Nonstate security actors may include tribal militias, private security firms, and other

nongovernmental armed organizations.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include planning for

disposition of security institutions; identification of future roles, missions, and structures;

vetting key officials; and conducting security force assistance and building HN capacity to

protect military structure and military capability.

Support Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Effective disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration reduce drivers of conflict, build a stable society, and create a legitimate state

monopoly over the means of violence. These matters often require informal negotiations as

peace agreements often focus on ending hostilities and avoiding lesser but still important

subsequent matters.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces include negotiating terms,

establishing weapons control programs, establishing monitoring programs and/or demobilization

camps, disarming combatants, collecting unauthorized weapons, and reintegrating combatants

back into society.

Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement. Border security reinforces

national sovereignty and prevents interstate conflict. This includes physical security provided by

military, border, or coast guard forces while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals,

and goods across the border, maritime terrain, or into ports of entry. Border control measures

regulate immigration, control movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties,

limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine.

When confronted with an internal threat, the host nation secures its borders to prevent an influx of

foreign fighters and other external threats and keep insurgents from getting support or using

neighboring countries as sanctuaries. In some situations, the host nation secures its intranational

boundaries to prevent factional conflict. In addition to border control, freedom of legitimate

international and internal movement is essential for normal economic and social interaction.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include conducting border

security operations, supporting HN border security efforts, monitoring the border, establishing

movement rules, dismantling roadblocks, establishing checkpoints, training and equipping border

control and boundary security forces, and ensuring freedom of movement.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-5

Support Identification Programs. Identification programs support security, governance, and the rule

of law and document individuals, businesses, and corporations. These measures support legitimate

activity, enable government regulation, and generate revenue. Other purposes include ensuring

legitimate political participation; adjudicating property disputes; restricting the activities of

individuals who have perpetrated major crimes, atrocities, or abuses; and isolating or

neutralizing belligerents. Effective population identification methods facilitate establishing

a secure and stable environment for the population.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include securing

documents, establishing identification programs, and enforcing use of and adherence to the

identification programing.

Protect Key Personnel and Facilities. Throughout stabilization efforts, Marine Corps operating

forces may ensure that high priority personnel and facilities have protection, which may include

arrangements for emergency medical support. With relatively little effort, belligerents can

eliminate a critical partner or destroy a complex facility and either event can significantly set

back and undermine mission success.

Subordinate tasks may include protection of stabilization and reconstruction personnel and

resources, provision of emergency logistic support, protection of cultural sites, and protection

of critical infrastructure and civil records. Other tasks may include protecting military facilities

and lines of communications, identifying and disposing of ordnance, building HN capacity to

provide own protection, and advising and assisting with HN security forces protection efforts.

Clear Explosive Ordnance. Explosive ordnance includes unexploded explosive ordnance;

mines; loose, stockpiled, or deteriorated ordnance; and illicit ordnance caches. Marine Corps

operating forces aim to prevent adversaries from acquiring these items and prevent these

hazards from harming civilians and friendly forces. Subordinate efforts may include explosive

ordnance disposal.

Provide Humanitarian Assistance

Conflict, especially extended conflict, results in human suffering caused by acute shortages of water,

food, shelter, clothing, bedding, and medical aid. Marine Corps forces are often the first response

force on the scene and support HN efforts to provide humanitarian assistance with logistics,

distribution, communication, and other relief capabilities and supplies. Most often, Marine

Corps operating forces work in support of other USG departments and agencies, the host nation,

or others. Depending on the situation, providing humanitarian assistance may include three

subtasks, providing local security, distributing relief supplies, and supporting dislocated

civilians (DC).

Provide Local Security. Humanitarian assistance efforts are often hampered by lawlessness

caused by looters, muggers, and robbers. Often these criminal elements take to the street as

gangs and hamper local efforts to provide needed aid and assistance. Marine Corps forces will

provide local security to humanitarian relief efforts, protect the effected population, relief

personnel, and relief supplies.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-6

Distribute Relief Supplies. During most US involvement in disaster relief operations, US forces

will not be called to assist. However, there may disasters or security situations so severe that

DOD capabilities are requested. In most cases, the largest contribution is air and ground lift

transportation of relief supplies to distributing organizations in the affected area. It is important

to note that US forces should only deliver supplies directly to the population when absolutely

necessary. Otherwise, relief supplies should be delivered to the host nation, indigenous

populations and institutions, USAID, IGO, or another sanctioned entity. This concept is

referred to as wholesale distribution versus retail distribution. The MAGTF should stay in

the wholesale distribution business and only conduct retail distribution when

absolutely necessary.

Support Dislocated Civilians. Dislocated civilians may have been forced to leave their homes due

to violence, natural disaster, and environmental conditions such as drought. Dislocated civilians

are particularly vulnerable to starvation, dehydration, disease, or additional acts of violence.

These persons can greatly complicate relief efforts. Most often, Marine Corps operating forces

support DCs by supporting organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or

other UN agency that leads DC relief efforts. Occasionally, Marines provide direct assistance

and security to DC camps.

Support and/or Provide Restoration of Essential Services

Restoring essential services to local expectations of normalcy allows a population to return

to their routine, daily activities and prevents further destabilization. Host nation government

or civilian relief agencies work best to restore and develop essential services. In most cases,

local, international, and US civilian agencies or organizations arrived in country long before

US forces. However, when these organizations are not established or lack the necessary

capacity, Marine Corps operating forces provide support in a limited capacity until the civilian

organizations are established.

Essential services are often grouped under the acronym SWEAT (sewage, water, electricity,

academics, and trash), as well as medical, safety, and other considerations (shelter, transportation,

communications, etc.). The MAGTF must be prepared to conduct necessary coordination with

civilian entities to ensure progression in or restoration of SWEAT and medical, safety, shelter,

transportation, and communications services. Civil affairs Marines are ideal for this coordination and

can support the staff in planning for operations that support restoration of essential services. In

extreme cases, Marine Corps combat engineers and utilities personnel may need to undertake

projects that temporarily provide services to the local population until appropriate civilian

organizations take over.

Support Establishment of Civil Control

Civil control is the ability for the sanctioned local leadership to manage the disputes and conflicts

within the population effectively and fosters the rule of law. The rule of law refers to a principle

of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities (public and private, including the

State) are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently

adjudicated, and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Civil control

is based on a society that ensures that citizens live in a safe society in which individuals and

groups adhere to the rule of law. The rule of law provides equal access to a justice system that

is consistent with international human rights standards. This is a long-term process developed

by civilian entities.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-7

Marine Corps forces support civil control and the rule of law in order to improve the capability,

capacity, and legitimacy of HN judicial and corrections systems by providing training and support to

law enforcement and judicial personnel. The focus is to implement temporary or interim capabilities

to lay the foundation for HN or interorganizational development of this sector.

Depending on the situation, establishing security for civil control may include six subtasks, which

are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

Support Establishment of Public Order and Safety. Public order is a condition in which laws are

enforced equitably. The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal

and politically-motivated violence is minimal; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to

leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained. Public safety permits

people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence. Long-term

sustainability of reforms depends on the achievement of public order and safety.

Subordinate tasks may include population protection, ensuring access to endangered

populations, performance of civil police functions, safeguarding witnesses and evidence,

population control, crowd control, and security for criminal justice and security institutions.

Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform. Law enforcement and policing operations comprise

an essential component of civil control. Typically, civilian agencies provide support for law

enforcement and police reform. Sometimes HN civilian police forces succumb to corruption and

locals distrust them. As a result, US or HN forces with law enforcement experience fill the void

and provide this support until civilian agencies or organizations can do so.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include identification of crime

evidence, identification and detention of perpetrators, support vetting and accounting, deployment of

police trainers and advisors, assessment of police facilities and systems.

Support Justice System Reform. Stabilization requires the populace to perceive their nation’s the

justice system as legitimate, fair, and effective. Justice system reform activities aim to achieve

broad institutional reform by updating legal statutes and reorganizing fundamental justice system

structures to ensure basic fairness and protect human rights. While civilian agencies typically lead

such reform efforts, military forces sometimes establish and maintain the security necessary to

facilitate future efforts.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include support to

communications and provide security to personnel and facilities.

Support Corrections Reform. Corrections reform is an integral part of broader security sector

reform. Corrections reform includes building HN penal system capacity by restoring institutional

infrastructure, providing oversight of the incarceration process, and training HN personnel to

internationally accepted standards. Tasks also include instituting a comprehensive assessment of the

prisoner population, determining the status of prisoners, and establishing procedures to help

reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process into society.

Subordinate tasks performed by Marine Corps forces may include identification of detention,

correction, or rehabilitative facilities; preservation of penal administrative records; assessment of

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-8

prison populations and conditions; implementation of humanitarian standards in prisons;

provision of emergency detention facilities; deployment of penal trainers and advisors;

refurbishment of prison facilities at key sites; coordination of jurisdiction and handover; and

facilitation of international monitoring.

Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals. Although the international community oversees the

conduct of war crimes courts and tribunals, Marine Corps operating forces may provide support for

their activities as part of the broad process of justice system reform. Support may include protecting

witnesses; identifying, securing, and preserving evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and

crimes against humanity; supporting the investigation, arrest, and transfer of war criminals; and

coordinating efforts with other agencies and organizations. Subordinate tasks may include security

of facilities and establishment of an atrocity reporting system.

Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs. The reconciliation process requires

public outreach and community rebuilding while promoting public respect for the rule of law.

Tasks performed by Marine Corps operating forces may include training, advising, and assisting

HN agencies in developing public access to information and assessing the needs of vulnerable

populations, such as women, children, and the elderly. Subordinate tasks may include supporting

the ability of HN agencies to establish information programs, develop public access to information,

and assess population needs.

Support Economic and Infrastructure Development

In post-conflict and fragile states, HN actors often have the best qualifications to lead efforts

to restore and help develop HN economic capabilities, not USG departments and agencies,

IGO’s, and civilian relief agencies. The goal is to establish conditions so that the host nation can

generate its own revenues and not rely upon outside aid. Security considerations or other factors

may make HN actors incapable of assisting initially. In these instances, Marine Corps forces

may support efforts to assist the host nation begin the process of achieving or preserving

sustainable economic development. Preserving assets such as production facilities, hospitals,

universities, existing companies, and markets dramatically reduces the time required to

re-establish a sustainable level of economic activity.

Before implementing any activities, Marine Corps forces must first assess the economic and

infrastructure situation in their operational area. This assessment should be based on local norms

and should identify and prioritize the sources of instability that threaten effective economic and

infrastructure development.

Subordinate tasks may require Marine Corps operating forces to protect natural resources and

the environment as well as support—

 Economic generation.

 Public sector investment programs.

 Agricultural investment programs.

 Transportation infrastructure programs.

 Telecommunications infrastructure programs.

 General infrastructure reconstruction programs.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-9

Depending on the situation, supporting economic and infrastructure development may include

five subtasks, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Support the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment. Marine Corps forces with HN, US,

and international partners assess locations and amounts of vital natural resources. Vital natural

resources include, but is not limited to, oil, gas, strategic minerals, diamonds, and timber. Marine

Corps forces support the security of vital natural resources collaborating with HN, US, and

international actors to assess and secure access to vital natural resources, including existing HN

extraction facility locations and capacities and movement of these resources to markets.

Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation. Creating jobs is central to any economic

recovery program. Many activities fall under the task of job creation, including immediate, short-

term opportunities that yield quick impact or the development of more enduring livelihoods in the

civil service or private sector. Marine Corps forces implement initiatives to provide immediate

employment as this initiative gets people back to work and gets money flowing, even if only

temporarily. These initiatives may include development of quick impact public sector jobs such as

collecting trash, cleaning up public places, installing generators, and rebuilding infrastructure such

as roads, bridges, and electric grids.

Support Agricultural Development Programs. A nation’s agriculture sector serves as the foundation

of food security, defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets

people’s dietary needs. Beyond supporting food security, a viable market economy relies on an

integrated agricultural development with links through all levels of a nation’s economy. Marine

Corps forces may provide security for post-harvest storage facilities and support the rebuilding of

small-scale irrigation systems and repair small-scale infrastructure such as storage. Commander’s

emergency response program funds may be used to support these programs if existing authorities

approve their use within the operational area.

Support Restoration of Transportation Infrastructure. United States forces may be required to assess

the overall condition of national transportation infrastructure—airports, roads, bridges, railways,

and coastal and inland ports, harbors, waterways—including facilities and equipment. For each

infrastructure, US forces assess its management organization and facilities, maintenance, and

security. Marine Corps forces assess the transportation infrastructure in their operational area

and provide an infrastructure assessment in terms of status, capacity, future requirements, and

potential shortfalls given damage from conflict, natural disaster, or neglect. Marine Corps forces

may conduct expedient repairs of roads and runways. Ports and airfields are of special importance

to the economy and to the perceived legitimacy of the HN government and often receive priority

status for restoration.

Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs. As either a joint force or a MAGTF,

Marine Corps forces may conduct expedient repairs or support construction of new facilities to

support the local populace. Expedient measures include providing power; restoring structural

integrity; providing heat, lighting, and plumbing; or installing doors and windows. Prioritized

facilities likely include schools, medical clinics, municipal buildings, and water and sewage

management facilities.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

2-10

Support to Governance

Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior

by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society,

including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under

inclusive, constitutional authority. Effective, legitimate governance ensures these activities

are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Elections do not necessarily

ensure these outcomes. In societies divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections

may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions based on universal suffrage

offer the best means fostering governance acceptable to the majority of the citizens. If the

HN government or community organizations cannot provide governance, some degree of

military support may be necessary. See JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, for more information

on governance and COIN operations

Stability operations often occur in failed or fragile state situations or when the HN government has

difficulty resolving stabilization and reconstruction challenges. In some cases, HN governments can

function and exercise their sovereign responsibility. In these cases, international actors, including

Marine Corps forces, support HN government authorities. However, if the HN government is

dysfunctional or absent, military forces may be obligated to provide interim governance as a

transitional military authority until the host nation establishes a responsible civilian authority.

Depending on the situation, support to governance may include three subtasks, which are

discussed in the following paragraphs.

Support Transitional Administrations. Stabilization efforts, particularly in a failed state, incorporate

a series of transitional governmental administrations until the host nation establishes a permanent

arrangement. In some cases, US forces may initially be assigned responsibility as a transitional

military authority, to be followed by an external provisional civilian authority controlled by the USG,

a coalition, or other IGO. Responsibility eventually transfers to HN authorities.

Support Development of Local Governance. Normally, civilian agencies support local governance

and building local governance capacity. Marine Corps forces may support civilian agencies in

improving governance in local communities. Local governance provides the foundation on

which to develop higher-level governance. Generally, unit operational areas align with HN

political boundaries (e.g., provinces, districts), which helps integrate governance with assigned

Marine security requirements.

Support Elections. Elections represent progress and stability. More importantly, they legitimize the

government by reflecting the population’s endorsement. Marine Corps forces primarily establish

and maintain secure conditions that allow the host nation to conduct campaigning and elections.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-1

CHAPTER 3

PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Planning stability operations requires consideration of many factors, some not generally considered

by military planners. The centrally important planning consideration is that a long-term view

is required. Stability operations are, at their essence, political with interlocking instruments of

diplomacy, economics, information, and military action. The stability operations environment

requires an inclusive approach, which extends beyond the joint community and into the interagency.

Early collaboration with interagency partners is a critical component to reduce risk and help ensure

success. In operating in these complex environments, Marines must understand interagency partner

capabilities and limitations and integrate them into all actions from the early planning phase through

execution and transition. As planning is widely discussed in other doctrinal publications such as

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, this chapter

focuses on planning considerations unique to stability operations. Failure to provide adequate

planning attention on any of these considerations may compromise mission success.

UNIFIED ACTION

Unified action coordinates and/or integrates the activities of governmental and nongovernmental

entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort, the product of unified

action, is defined as the “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the

participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of

successful unified action.” (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States)

One of the defining features of contemporary stabilization environments is the array of participants

present in the theater of operations. The range of external stakeholders could include various USG

departments and agencies, allies (who themselves often have a multiagency presence), IGOs, NGOs,

and private sector interests. Despite the differing organizational cultures, experiences,

and timelines that inevitably will exist among stakeholders, it is imperative that there be a shared

understanding of the international objectives and operational environment, cooperative planning and

assessment, and coordinated, integrated (when appropriate) actions and activities—unified action.

Stabilization efforts are primarily the responsibility of development and Foreign Service

personnel from across the USG. The DOS—

 Is responsible for leading a whole of government approach to stabilization.

 Leads and coordinates US interagency participation in a comprehensive approach to stabilization

efforts that include not only the United States but also the host nation, other nations, IGOs,

cooperating NGOs, and other participants.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-2

When stabilization activities occur in a nation state, the primary coordination occurs with the

country team. The GCC formulates a theater security cooperation plan with the country teams

that are located within the region.

The interrelated responsibilities and authorities of the participants in stability operations often

create friction. Achieving unity of command in stability operations is not always possible.

Instead, participants strive to unify actions to achieve unity of effort. The MAGTF commander

must realize this and be comfortable with its implications throughout the operation.

Detailed planning and good personal relationships are critical for unity of effort. Clear lines of

responsibility—ranging from the ambassador, through the joint force commander (JFC), to the

MAGTF commander—are essential.

Stability operations often include coalition partners. This is especially true in humanitarian

assistance and disaster-relief operations. Coalition partners bring expertise and needed capabilities

that must be integrated into the operation as part of the unified action. Reference JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, and Marine Corps Tactical

Publication (MCTP) 3-03C, MAGTF Interorganizational Coordination, for additional information.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil-military operations (CMO) are those civil-military activities planned and performed by

military forces to maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental

agencies, and nongovernmental civilian organizations and in order to re-establish the functions

normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. Civil-military

operations are inherent to all military operations that require interorganizational coordination

and the management of local populations as it relates to executing the MAGTF mission.

Civil-military operations planning ensures careful analysis of the civil landscape and ensures

incorporation of civil considerations into the overall planning process. Civil-military operations

planning includes the design and integration of civil-military activities into MAGTF plans in

support of the commander’s objectives. It is unique in that much of what is planned involves

military forces to maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental

agencies, nongovernmental civilian organizations, and the civilian populace to achieve the

commander’s desired end state.

Proficient CMO planners are skilled at providing the commander and staff with situational

awareness and in creating a shared understanding of the problem from a civil-military perspective.

Civil preparation of the battlespace is used to examine civil considerations in support of mission

analysis and the overall intelligence preparation of the battlespace process. Civil preparation of

the battlespace is conducted through the framework of METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain and

weather, troops and support available-time available] in order to focus on civil aspects as it relates

to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the

battlespace uses a myriad of methods to specifically analyze different aspects of civil information

and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors, as well as the local

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-3

populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives. The CMO planner can

effectively build understanding of CMO considerations as the plan is transitioned to current

operations and executed by elements of the MAGTF.

Products of CMO planning might include the CMO staff estimate, CMO-related tasks in the

basic order, and the associated annex G/appendices/tabs. One coordination tool available to the

commander that civil affairs Marines provide is the civil-military operations center. The civil-

military operations center is a civil-military coordination element, normally comprised and ran by

civil affairs Marines, established to plan and facilitate coordination of MAGTF activities within

indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, IGOs, NGOs, multinational forces,

and other governmental agencies. The civil-military operations center facilitates continuous

coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO from local levels to international

levels within a given operational area and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the

common operational picture. For more information on CMO, reference MCTP 3-03A, Marine

Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations.

INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

Communication coordination and integration is crucial to success in stability operations. The

narrative during an operation is enduring with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state. When

stabilization or reconstruction are conducted in areas with significant adversary or belligerent

activity, there can be a continuing clash between competing protagonist narratives. This is

sometimes referred to as the battle of the narratives. Losing this battle can translate to strategic

operational failure.

Throughout the operation, three primary supporting military capabilities—public affairs,

information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy—should be continually

coordinated and integrated, both horizontally and vertically. The JFC’s communications

strategy should support the broader interagency communication effort and closely coordinate

support from other agencies and organizations. This strategy must be commander driven,

proactive, and integrated with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions.

In addition to the requirement for early and accurate understanding of factors contributing to

instability, international media interest, especially when there is human suffering, requires careful

alignment of stability actions with narratives that enhance HN governance and deter exploitive or

aggressive actions by hostile state and nonstate actors. Proactive integration of the narrative will

help to positively influence what the relevant population thinks is legitimate.

ASSESSMENT

Assessment is defined as, “A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of

employing joint force capabilities during military operations.” (JP 1-02) It is used to determine

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-4

progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Assessment

provides understanding that is vital to planning and executing stability operations. As much as

possible, commanders use an understanding of culture, governance, history, and the nature of the

environment to inform the assessment and address the symptoms and possible sources of

instability. Assessment should be collaborative and include other USG departments and agencies,

HN partners, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector interests.

In some cases, assessments take the form of initial staff or intelligence estimates. These will serve as

the basis for planning. Planning develops this into an operational assessment that determines how

well the plan is being carried out and if objectives are being met. Plans may be changed as required

by the evolving situation.

Initial Assessment

The purpose of the initial assessment is to understand the situation and determine the nature,

scope, and severity of the problem at hand. Since the situation is always more complicated

than it seems when the naval force first becomes involved, the initial assessment should be a

collaborative effort of the naval force and partnering agencies—other US forces, Federal civilian

agencies, and international and HN civilian and military agencies.

If there is not enough time to thoroughly conduct the initial assessment or to work the

assessment with partner agencies before planning begins, then the initial assessment process

will continue simultaneously with planning. From this perspective, the initial assessment will

continue to inform the planning process as new partners join and new developments arise.

Operational Assessment

Operational assessment has three purposes that are conducted in the following order:

 Monitor the nature, scope, and severity of the situation to present the situation.

 Track the implementation of the plan in combination with collaborating agencies to

determine what key actors are doing.

 Evaluate progress towards achieving goals or objectives, which builds on the other two

purposes and answers the question, “So what?”

Operational assessment should reflect the achievements of collaborating partners. For example,

Marine Corps component activities will be necessary for achieving goals and objectives of the

JFC but cannot do so alone. Obtaining reliable information surrounding the social, cultural,

political, and economic status is necessary to achieve an accurate assessment.

Assessment Frameworks and Models

Various assessment frameworks and models have been developed by elements of the

interorganizational community to assist in assessing status, evaluating progress, and measuring

effectiveness of interorganizational activities in support of a range of domestic and international

support activities. A few of these assessment frameworks and/or models have gained fairly

wide acceptance and are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-5

Stability Assessment Framework. The Stability Assessment Framework is a holistic, analytical,

planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal

targeting approaches during MAGTF operations. The Stability Assessment Framework helps

Marine and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability and design programs

or activities that address these sources and measure their effect in fostering stability.

The Stability Assessment Framework reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on

understanding and integrating multiple perspectives into planning and assessment. The Stability

Assessment Framework methodology has four basic components—civil preparation of the

battlespace, analysis, design and monitoring, and monitoring and evaluation—nested within

the civil affairs methodology and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). These

components complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes used during

civil affairs operations. To the maximum extent possible, all relevant actors and organizations in the

battlespace should be encouraged to participate in the Stability Assessment Framework process in

order to create comprehensive efforts while conducting stability operations. See appendix B for

more information.

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. The purpose of the Interagency Conflict Assessment

Framework (ICAF) is to develop, across relevant USG departments and agencies, a commonly

held understanding of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that

informs US policy and planning decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic

baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is a process and a tool available

for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

The ICAF draws on existing methodologies currently in use by various USG departments and

agencies as well as international organizations and NGOs for assessing conflict. The ICAF is not

intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within

the intelligence community. Rather, it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a

common framework through which USG departments and agencies can leverage and share the

knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk

of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent

conflict. Early warning and forecasting products feed the ICAF analysis and help an interagency

team understand why such conditions may exist and how to best engage those conditions to

transform them. The ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an

interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics that are shown to increase or

decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, an ICAF analysis provides a shared,

strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.

An ICAF analysis should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process in order to

inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshape activities, implement or revise programs,

or allocate/reallocate resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF analysis is

performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF analysis, time and place for

conducting the analysis, type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of

classification required.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-6

Security Sector Reform. Published by USAID but recognized as guidance for the USG, the Security

Sector Reform provides a common foundation for USG agencies to assess a country’s security and

justice context and make strategic program recommendations. Assessments should inform the

strategic planning process and underlie program design. The Security Sector Reform is divided

into two parts: a 10-step framework for analysis and areas of inquiry with illustrative questions.

The Security Sector Reform outlines key SSR concepts and a process for planning and conducting

an interagency assessment. Supplementary assessment tools that focus on specific subsector

institutions and topics (e.g., police, criminal justice, defense, maritime security sector reform, armed

violence reduction, gender) can be helpful in looking at particular subjects in greater detail. This

broader assessment framework enables the assessment team to examine the linkages among various

components of the security sector and to identify entry points for integrated programs.

Maritime Security Sector Reform. The Maritime Security Sector Reform (commonly referred to as

The MSSR Guide) is an analytical tool designed to map and assess the maritime sector, to assess

existing maritime security sector capabilities and gaps, and to enable coordination and

collaboration to improve maritime safety and security. It can be used to support a full-scale

maritime sector assessment, to obtain a snapshot of one or more aspects of a country’s maritime

sector, or to facilitate discussion among national actors with maritime responsibilities. The MSSR

Guide is designed to be used in conjunction with other tools, particularly when a more in-depth

treatment of a function or capability may be warranted.

The MSSR Guide may be used by a wide range of maritime stakeholders. It is based on standards and

best practices from a variety of sources and does not embody the practice or standards

of any particular country or group of countries. United States Government departments and

agencies however, may wish to consult with the DOS; DOD; Departments of Homeland

Security, Transportation, and Justice; and USAID when considering programs based on a maritime

security sector reform assessment. See The MSSR Guide for a more comprehensive discussion.

Measures Progress in Conflict Environments. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

(MPICE)– A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization,

released in 2010, is the result of work by hundreds of academics, government officials, NGO

representatives, and other experts and practitioners who gathered under USG steering committee

oversight to refine a set of emerging metrics for assessing progress in conflict environments.

This document consists of a hierarchical metrics system of outcome-based goals, indicators, and

measures. Once collected, the measures can be aggregated to provide indications of trends

toward the achievement of stabilization goals over time. These metrics assist in formulating

policy and implementing operational and strategic plans to transform conflict and bring stability

to war-torn societies. These metrics provide both a baseline operational- and strategic-level

assessment tool for policymakers to diagnose potential obstacles to stabilization prior to an

intervention and an instrument for practitioners to track progress from the point of intervention

through stabilization and development and ultimately to a self-sustaining peace. This metrics

system is designed to identify potential sources of continuing violent conflict and instability; to

gauge the capacity of indigenous institutions in order to overcome them; and to enable

policymakers to establish realistic goals, bring adequate resources and authorities to bear, focus

their efforts strategically, and enhance prospects for attaining an enduring peace.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-7

Other Models. Other assessment models have been developed and used by various organizations.

Some of these models have their basis in systems design, while others have theirs in civil

engineering or conflict simulation study. Four additional assessment models include—

 ADDIE [analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation], which is an

instructional systems development process model.

 Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), which identifies

characteristics of civil considerations during a military campaign.

 DIME [diplomatic, informational, military and economic], which identifies elements

instruments of national power.

 Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), which are

elements in system of systems thinking to describe the foundation and features of an enemy

(or ally) state, help determine the state's strengths and weaknesses, and help estimate the effects

various actions will have on states across these areas.

TRANSITIONS

Transition is a passage from one state, change, subject, or place to another. There are two

important aspects to transitions:

 Plan for an early transition of the lead to a more appropriate government agency (normally

DOS) once the security situation is restored.

 Reinforce the HN capability and capacity to fulfill and exercise their authority and responsibility.

Transitions occur as a result of—

 Changes to mission.

 Changes in enemy tactics or actions.

 Additional functions.

 Changes in environment.

 Changes in location.

 Changes to task organization.

Transitions must be planned. For example, consider Marines engaged in FHA. The transition

challenge revolves around the limited resources and capabilities of most aid providers and the

restrictions in US Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, for the funding of these nonmilitary functions.

In planning the transitions for FHA, the JFC must coordinate closely with the country team and

GCC to establish timelines and public information related to the transition of maritime support

to FHA activities.

In some cases, a transitional military authority may be required in an ungoverned area, occupied

territory, or an allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces (e.g., insurgent or rebel

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-8

forces). A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the

functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It exercises

temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a foreign territory. The authority to

establish military governance by US military personnel resides with the President of the United

States. The US forces will only assume control as prescribed in directives to the JFC.

FUNDING STABILITY OPERATIONS

The US Congress imposes fiscal controls on the Executive Branch’s ability to obligate and expend

appropriated funds. Multiple funding sources (e.g., DOD, DOS) may have to be used to fund

stability operations, adding additional layers of complexity and requiring detailed planning.

A thorough understanding of funding sources and authorities is necessary to provide fiscal

support for stability operations. The DOS is the largest single provider of foreign assistance on

behalf of the USG. However, use of DOD operations and maintenance funds has specific

limitations in stability operations. Generally, operations and maintenance can be used to fund

and train foreign military forces only if the purpose of the training is interoperability, safety, or

familiarization of those forces with US Armed Forces. Therefore, it is important to know where

funding may be available, depending on the nature of the stability operations being conducted.

For stability operations of extended duration, the US Congress may provide specific funding

authorizations. In recent contingency operations, the US Congress appropriated additional funds

to commanders specifically for the purpose of stability operations and related mission types

(e.g., COIN). Examples of authorized, additional funding include the Commander’s Emergency

Response Program, Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, Commander’s

Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program Funds, Afghan Security Forces Fund.

LEGITIMACY

The credibility of the HN government and its ability to generate consent is crucial. The population’s

attitude toward US or multinational forces may be a significant element in this but, ultimately, is

of secondary importance. Consent for the presence of US forces conducting stability operations

will encompass a spectrum of attitudes and vary from active opposition, through grudging

tolerance, to active support. In order to be seen as legitimate, the actions of the United States

and its partner nations must progressively and inexorably convince the majority of the

population and wider audiences, including adversaries, that the HN government will prevail

and that an acceptable political settlement will be reached.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

3-9

RESTRAINT

During stability operations, securing and protecting the population is paramount. It is on this

foundation of civil security that the political settlement can be achieved. This, coupled with the

need to provide force protection for the joint force (as well as for other organizations, if directed),

may require conducting combat operations in combination with stability operations. However,

using force or excessive force often antagonizes the population, possibly damaging the legitimacy

of the HN government and the organization that uses force while enhancing adversary legitimacy.

Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of protecting the people and infrastructure,

conducting military operations, and achieving the overarching objectives of the operation. A single

act can cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, when force is used, it must

be lawful and measured. Restraint is best achieved when all military personnel understand the

political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions and when the rules of

engagement are sensitive to political concerns but consistent with the right and obligation of

self-defense. A de-escalation of force mindset is often appropriate during the conflict and

stabilization activities.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-1

CHAPTER 4

MARITIME STABILITY OPERATIONS

UNDERSTANDING MARITIME STABILITY OPERATIONS

Sea-based Marines tread lightly on host nation infrastructure and sovereignty, making

our presence less onerous on host governments. . . . Because we’re sized more closely to

the security forces of many other nations, the U.S. Marine Corps provides a model of

tightly integrated air-ground-logistics force. That’s something they’re eager to achieve

with their own armed forces. The scalability of Marines resonates with them, as does our

warrior ethos.

General James F. Amos,

Commandant, US Marine Corps,

in an address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies on November 8, 2012

Operating from the sea, the Naval Service extends its influence over land, often in close

coordination with ground or amphibious forces, to ensure that the maritime commons and its

structures support the safe flow of commerce and contribute to good governance. The Naval

Service also contributes to stability by denying those who wish to engage in illegal activity access

to the maritime domain.

The Naval Services’ primary contribution to stability operations is the provision of maritime

security, associated with protecting populations and maritime resources, while strengthening

governance in ways that promote economic and political progress. Naval forces may also

support other stability-related functions, such as providing humanitarian relief and emergency

reconstruction of key infrastructure.

The principal distinction between the Naval Service and the other armed services is the operational

area. Maritime operations are distinct from other military operations in three key aspects—maritime

domain, maritime laws, and force authority. The Naval Service operates primarily within the

maritime domain, which consists of the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and

the airspace above these, including the littorals (see JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint

Maritime Operations, for more information). The significant distinction between maritime

domain and maritime environment is the inclusion of the word littoral in the definition of

maritime domain. The littoral is comprised of two segments: the seaward portion and the

landward portion. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be

controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore

that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.

Approximately 80 percent of the 195 countries of the world are maritime nations linked

together by the seaward portion of the maritime domain. Many nations dispute internationally

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-2

recognized territorial boundaries with their maritime neighbors. Maritime geography, such as

straits or canals, concentrates seagoing vessels in restricted spaces and challenges the thousands

of commercial maritime vessels that transit the global commons daily. Like commercial vessels,

US naval operations in the littoral are also subject to tidal variations, sea states, weather, water

depth, currents, and the corrosive influence of salt water. The combinations of water, land, and

airspace, as well as space and cyberspace, conspire to present unique operational challenges to

naval forces.

JP 3-32 provides three terms—brown water, green water, and blue water—that describe the

aspects of the maritime domain:

 Brown water refers to “navigable rivers, lakes, bays, and their estuaries” and includes the

littoral zone from the bays, inlets, rivers, and harbors landward from the navigational approach

buoys. Often the term brown water navy refers to military/police forces that patrol harbors

and rivers.

 Green water refers to “coastal waters, ports, and harbors” and includes the coastal area from

the harbor approaches and coastlines seaward to the maximum effective range of coastal patrol

craft of limited military and constabulary capability. Green water navies are regional powers

who can extend their fleet a limited range.

 Blue water refers to the “high seas and open oceans,” or waters beyond the coastal area

unconstrained by land mass. Blue water navies are those who can travel the world while

displaying overwhelming force.

The world’s oceans are divided into two parts with each containing various maritime regimes or

zones under international law. The first is national waters: internal waters, territorial seas, and

archipelagic waters. These national waters are subject to the territorial sovereignty of coastal nations,

with certain navigational rights reserved to the international community. The second is international

waters: contiguous zones, waters of the economic exclusion zone, and the high seas. In international

waters, all nations enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, which includes the

right to conduct military operations in these waters. Integration of these concepts in all planning

phases of maritime stability operations is critical to mission success. A comprehensive description

of these zones and their effect on operations in the maritime domain are contained in the

tri-Service publication Navy Warfare Publication 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/Commandant

Publication 5800.7A, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.

The US Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security and is at all times an armed

force and a law enforcement organization. The US Coast Guard is mandated by law to effectively

execute 11 distinct and diverse maritime missions and has the unique statutory authority to

concurrently operate as a Military Service under US Code, Title 10, and as a maritime law

enforcement agency under US Code, Title 14, Coast Guard. Specifically, US Code, Title 14,

explicitly authorizes the US Coast Guard to enforce US Federal laws at sea. Additionally, the US

Navy is statutorily authorized to engage in detection and monitoring in support of counternarcotics

operations in certain areas of operation. The ability to actively engage in, or support, law

enforcement allows an additional and important aspect of stability operations to be conducted

by the maritime services.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-3

MARITIME STABILITY OPERATIONS: A LEGAL UNDERSTANDING

Another important distinction is that maritime operations in the maritime domain are subject to

domestic law and policy, as well as international law. Domestic law includes the legal statutes

of the coastal state that apply within its maritime jurisdiction. International law includes both

customary international law and international law stemming from various treaties and conventions

to which a nation is signatory (e.g., LOSC, 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at

Sea). Often participating nations will enter into bilateral agreements cooperating in suppressing

activities; such as, illicit narcotics trafficking and unsafe transport and smuggling of migrants.

The underlying concept of the LOSC is based on freedom of the seas, with a nation’s control of

the oceans limited to narrow bands adjacent to its coasts. This is the basis for the US policy of

respecting and enforcing rights of freedom of navigation and high seas freedoms for all states. This

core element of national policy establishes the standards by which US forces operate in the maritime

domain with respect to sovereign rights of coastal states and freedom of navigation of all states.

It is a critical element of operational planning in the maritime environment, shaping operational

norms and informing rules of engagement for concept of operations planning and execution.

The international instrument regulating the uses of the seas and maritime rights of the world’s

nations is the 1982 LOSC. Although it is not a party to LOSC, the United States recognizes that

LOSC’s navigational provisions reflect customary international law (United States Presidential

Proclamation of March 10, 1983). Navigational regimes under LOSC, reflective of customary

international law, determine the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the

conduct of merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within these areas. Therefore,

understanding these regimes is critical to all phases of operational planning and execution. The

principles regarding sovereignty, navigation, and overflight must likewise be integrated into any

associated rules of engagement and other direction on the use of force to achieve mission objectives.

UNITED STATES CODE

An important distinction of maritime operations is the broad authorities provided to US forces that

allow not only for a maritime military presence but provide for maritime law enforcement or the

support of maritime law enforcement. The five uniformed Services covered by the term US

Armed Forces are defined in US Code, Title 10, and include the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air

Force, and Coast Guard. While the traditional US Navy and US Marine Corps functions (e.g.,

deterrence, sea control, power projection, forward presence) are generally understood, those of the

US Coast Guard are not. United States Code, Titles 10 and 14, state that the US Coast Guard is “a

military service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times.” The US Coast

Guard is, at all times, a federal maritime law enforcement agency but may, at any time, provide

forces and/or perform its military functions in support of naval components or GCCs or may

operate as a specialized service in the Department of the Navy. “[U]pon the declaration of war if

Congress so directs in the declaration or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate

as a service in the Navy . . . .”

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-4

Pursuant to US Code, Title 14, the US Coast Guard has broad powers to “make inquiries,

examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over

which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of

violations of the laws of the US.” In other words, the US Coast Guard is specifically authorized to

enforce US Federal laws in US and international waters. Under certain specific circumstances, the

US Navy may be authorized to assist or support the US Coast Guard in executing their law

enforcement authorities.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

A stable maritime environment contributes to global safety and security. The stability of the

maritime domain is challenged in many ways by a variety of actors. These actors can be grouped

broadly as nation states, terrorists, and transnational criminals and pirates. For example, events

over the past decade—the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; the 2011 uprisings in North

Africa and the Middle East; and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that struck the east coast of

Japan—represent the complex challenges affecting the security environment. Natural disasters,

environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne migration are also sources of maritime instability.

Traditional State Challenges

The United States remains the world’s preeminent power. Global and regional powers exhibiting

aggressive nationalism test the resolve of the United States and its partners. Failed or failing states

provide safe havens for criminal and terrorist organizations that use these countries as bases of

operations to export illicit activities globally through the maritime domain. The probability of a

hostile state using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is expected to increase during the next

decade. An alternative danger is that a hostile state will provide critical advanced conventional

weaponry, WMD components, delivery systems and related materials, technologies, and weapons

expertise to a rogue state or a terrorist organization willing to conduct WMD attacks. Weapons of

mass destruction issues are of the greatest concern because the maritime domain is the most likely

venue to accommodate their transport to the United States.

Terrorist Challenges

State-sponsored terrorists, terrorist groups, or individual terrorist actors exploit open borders,

challenge national sovereignty, and increasingly threaten international affairs. Advanced

telecommunications can enable anonymous coordination among dispersed terrorist cells, increase

the effectiveness and reach of their message, and allow networking with or recruitment of other

like-minded organizations around the globe. Terrorists use shipping as a means of conveyance for

positioning their agents, obtaining logistical support, and generating revenue. They take advantage

of criminal smuggling networks to circumvent border security measures. The capabilities to board

and commandeer large underway vessels, as demonstrated in numerous piracy incidents, are also

employed to facilitate terrorist acts.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-5

Successful attacks in or through the maritime domain can disrupt regional and global economies.

Terrorists can employ a range of maritime attack capabilities from a variety of platforms,

including, but not limited to, the following:

 Explosives-laden suicide boats, light aircraft, and submersibles.

 Merchant and cruise ships used to ram another vessel, warships, port facilities, or offshore

platforms.

 Commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks.

 Underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports.

 Unmanned, underwater, explosive-delivery vehicles.

 Mines, which are low cost, readily available, easily deployed, difficult to counter, and require

minimal training.

 A vessel’s legitimate cargo (e.g., chemicals, petroleum, liquefied natural gas) can be used as the

explosive component of an attack.

Transnational Crime and Piracy Challenges

Continued growth in legitimate international commerce within the maritime domain has been

accompanied by growth in the use of the maritime domain for criminal purposes. Smuggling

people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband; piracy; and armed robbery of vessels produces

instability in the littorals and elsewhere. Maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of

money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations. Laundered

through the international financial system, this money provides a substantial source of virtually

untraceable funds. Laundered monetary assets can then be used to bribe government officials;

bypass established financial controls; and fund arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist

operations. Furthermore, these activities can ensure a steady supply of weapons and cash for

terrorist operatives as well as the means for their clandestine movement. Maritime crime and

piracy tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, especially in

regions with significant political or economic instability and little or no maritime law

enforcement capacity.

Maritime piracy has made a resurgence over the previous decade and is a major source of

instability. Individuals or groups are attracted to piracy by the potential for significant financial

gain at a lower risk than other criminal ventures and with less effort than legitimate work. Pirates

profit by ransoming passengers/crew members or by selling the cargo carried by the vessel. Lost

revenue due to paid ransoms, damaged cargo, and increased insurance premiums can adversely

affect maritime shipping companies and the national economies they support. The financial

impact on regional or state economies and the fear associated with piracy contribute to instability.

Natural Disasters

Earthquakes, mudslides, hurricanes, and tsunamis are natural disasters that often occur in the

increasingly crowded littoral regions of the world. Depending on the severity of the disaster, a

regional or international response may be required. Naval forces, as a result of their forward

deployed posture and organic capabilities (e.g., vertical and surface lift, medical capabilities,

access to food and water supplies, command and control), and their ability to remain offshore in

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-6

international waters, are frequently provided to assist countries struggling to recover from a

natural disaster.

Environmental Destruction

Intentional acts or acts of nature that result in environmental disasters can have far-reaching,

negative effects on the economic viability and political stability of a region. In recent years,

competition for declining marine resources has resulted in a number of violent confrontations as

some of the world’s fishers resort to unlawful activity. These actions continue to cause conflict

and regional instability. Similarly, massive pollution of the oceans results in significant damage to

ecosystems and undermines the national and economic security of the nations that depend on them.

Illegal Seaborne Migration

The unsafe transfer and smuggling of undocumented migrants is a long standing issue that will

remain a major challenge to regional stability and probably grow in scope and severity, especially

if the number of failed or failing states increases. Transnational migration, spurred by a decline

of social well-being or internal political unrest, has become common over the past decades. It

will likely continue to drive the movement of many people, with the potential to upset regional

stability because of the strain that migrants and refugees place on fragile economies and political

systems. In some countries, the collapse of political and social order prompts maritime mass

migrations, such as those from Cuba or Haiti to the United States or from North Africa to Europe.

Immigration can also be used as a political tool; such as, the mass migrations from Cuba to the

United States to escape rule by Fidel Castro. When mass migrations occur, the response to the

humanitarian and enforcement challenges requires a significant commitment of maritime

security resources.

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SERVICE

The Naval Service provides a multipurpose, expeditionary team whose capabilities are applicable

across a range of military operations. While most frequently employed to prevent conflict, these

forces are staffed, trained, and equipped to prevail in combat by providing the following

capabilities to the JFC:

 Given the dynamic nature of stability challenges, forward presence provides opportunity for

responding to disasters/providing humanitarian assistance and deterring aggression from state

and nonstate actors. Forward presence permits more effective response to instability by

creating conditions that strengthen HN governance.

 Persistent presence is provided while operating forward and respecting the sovereignty of

others. Naval forces conduct military engagements, secure cooperation to build partnerships,

and prevent and deter conflict. They communicate US intent; conduct crisis response and

limited contingency operations; and, when necessary, facilitate the introduction of additional

naval, joint, or multinational forces, as well as interagency or multinational organizations,

IGOs, or NGOs. The Naval Service’s ability to operate in the maritime domain allows it to

operate offshore, providing critical support while decisionmakers determine the full scope of

US Navy involvement, respecting the sovereignty concerns of both HN and regional partners.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-7

 Self-sustaining, sea-based expeditionary forces are uniquely tailored to prevent and prevail

from the sea with minimum reliance on ports or airfields in an objective area. For the Naval

Service, expeditionary is not limited to being an armed force organized to accomplish a specific

objective in a foreign country. Being expeditionary is one of the defining characteristics of

the Naval Service—ready to respond when leaving the pier, persistently forward postured, and

self-sustaining.

 Maritime domain expertise is ensured. Since the naval forces are skilled at operating in this

maneuver space, they are fully cognizant of the complexities of the sea, air, and land interfaces.

 Flexible force options are scalable with respect to capability, capacity, and legal authorities.

Naval force posture is a cost-effective means for influencing events in the littorals while

remaining ready to respond to crisis. When required, naval forces can be rapidly reinforced by

other naval forces surged from globally-dispersed locations. The inherent mobility,

organizational agility, and self-sustainability of a maritime force provides GCCs with a variety

of options, including the ability to command and control JTFs from afloat and ashore across the

range of military operations.

 Expanded deterrence is provided through credible, maneuverable, forward deployed, and

scalable power projection capabilities (e.g., ballistic-missile defense, nuclear strike, prevention

activities) that build capable partners and address the causes of instability and conflict.

 Joint, multinational, and interagency personnel to facilitate comprehensive stability efforts.

MARITIME, STABILITY-RELATED TASKS

Maritime, stability-related tasks are distinctly maritime in orientation and may require

US Navy, Coast Guard, or Marine Corps participation. These tasks, listed alphabetically, are

discussed in the following subparagraphs.

Aid to Distressed Mariners Operations

Under customary international law, masters of vessels have an obligation to render assistance to

other mariners in distress. Furthermore, US law requires a master to render assistance, but only if

the master can do so without serious danger to the master’s own vessel or passengers.

Strengthening the ability of coastal states to render aid to distressed persons and to protect and

save property as well as life at sea is the goal of this task. This goal is accomplished by

promoting the governmental processes, competencies, capabilities, and professionalism of a

national search and rescue service in cooperation and coordination with other search and rescue

organizations; bilateral and regional cooperation; and adherence to international laws,

standards, and practices.

Antipiracy Operations

Antipiracy operations are actions taken “to thwart an illegal act of violence, depredation

(i.e., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed

for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or

aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.” (MCRP 5-12C) For

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-8

US flagged vessels, appropriate preventative actions should be taken in accordance with

Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (Revision 7) (this document is classified Sensitive Security

Information/For Official Use Only).

Arms Control

Arms control includes activities performed by military forces to verify conventional, nuclear,

biological, or chemical arms control agreements. Those actions may include seizing or destroying

weapons, dismantling or disposing of weapons and hazardous materials, and escorting deliveries

of weapons. Arms control also encompasses any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the

numbers, types, and performance characteristics of any weapon system. Furthermore, these

activities help reduce threats to regional security and assist in implementing arms agreements.

Counter Illicit Trafficking (Drugs, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Humans)

The DOD supports Federal law enforcement agencies, including the US Coast Guard and

foreign law enforcement departments and agencies, in their efforts to disrupt the illicit

trafficking of drugs, humans, or WMD. Military forces assist in detecting and monitoring

trafficking; support interdiction efforts of the US Coast Guard and other Federal and foreign

law enforcement departments and agencies; provide intelligence and logistic support; and

integrate command and control, communications system, and intelligence assets dedicated to

interdicting the movement of traffickers. Through its organic law enforcement authority, the US

Coast Guard uses a multifaceted layered approach to conduct maritime interdiction operations.

This includes—

 Deploying littoral and deep water assets.

 Supporting joint and combined operations with partner nations.

 Deploying law enforcement detachments on US Navy and allied assets.

 Supporting detection and monitoring operations.

 Supporting the tactical control and coordination of interdiction operations.

Counterpiracy

Counterpiracy operations are actions “taken in response to an illegal act of violence, depredation

(e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for

private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft

or against persons or property on-board such ship or aircraft.” (MCRP 5-12C) Counterpiracy

operations include US or coalition naval escorts for vessels transiting areas prone to acts of piracy,

surface and aerial patrols, and educating private and commercial shipping about best practices to

avoid falling victim to piracy.

Emergency Repair of Maritime Infrastructure

Maritime force engineers are capable of performing emergency repairs of maritime infrastructure

under varying conditions of instability. These engineers may embark in amphibious ships or be

airlifted to locations.

Exclusion Zone Enforcement

These operations employ coercive measures to prohibit specified activities in a specific

geographic area. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to persuade either a

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-9

nation or a group to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body. Failure to

modify behavior can result in initiation or continuation of sanctions by the sanctioning body or the

use of or threat of use of force.

Expeditionary Diving and Salvage

Harbor and port infrastructure are critical to stability operations, especially those needed when in

response to a crisis. An underwater assessment of approaches to the port and piers may discover

damage that must be repaired before the port can function properly. Mobile dive and salvage units

conduct underwater surveys and perform light clearance operations. Underwater construction

teams can perform more extensive repairs. Specialized diving and salvage support vessels may

be required to support underwater repairs.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Unexploded ordnance is a lethal hazard to personnel. The importance of securing and destroying

unexploded ordnance cannot be overemphasized. Failure to secure unexploded ordnance may result

in its widespread use as an agent of instability.

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Operations

Freedom of navigation and overflight operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international

rights to navigate sea or air routes in accordance with international law.

Gas-Oil Platform

Gas-oil platform (GOPLAT) operations involve preventing adversaries from interrupting the

normal functions of these facilities. Naval forces can provide point security for these facilities.

For example, if an adversary gains control of a GOPLAT, a specialized interdiction operation

involving the takedown of the platform may be required.

Maritime Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations

and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce

governments or societies to achieve their goals.” (JP 1-02) This applies to countering all irregular

threats occurring in the maritime domain—both HN territorial waters and international waters—

that affect the stabilization efforts of optimal end states.

Maritime Interception

Maritime interception operations employ measures to intercept the movement of designated

illegal items (e.g., drugs, migrants, WMD) into or out of a nation or specified area to hold the

actors responsible for their illegal behavior pursuant to the objectives of the nation or international

body that establishes the sanctions. Maritime interception operations include enhanced maritime

interdiction operations, which are aimed at stopping a threat deemed a clear and present danger.

Enhanced maritime interdiction operations can be executed to support the countering of WMDs

(including associated dual-use technologies and materials) and to stop the exchange of WMD

expertise and delivery systems between states of concern and state/nonstate actors.

Mine Countermeasures

Undersea mines, both improvised explosive devices or manufactured by foreign militaries, may be

used to harass, disrupt, or prevent maritime stability operations or disrupt commercial maritime

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-10

commerce. Since mines may be implanted quickly, a bottom survey should be conducted of all

essential routes in order to sustain sea-based stability operations.

Offshore Resource Protection

Host nation offshore resources, such as oil-related infrastructures, seabed mining, and fishing

grounds, are vital to its economic and political stability. When threatened by state or nonstate

actors, securing these resources requires patrol and interdiction capabilities as well as law

enforcement authorities. The Naval Service can employ embarked US Navy, Marine Corps, and

Coast Guard personnel to secure critical offshore resources and temporarily enforce a country’s

exclusive economic zone as provided for within existing HN and international laws. If an

adversary’s force has gained control of an offshore resource, such as a GOPLAT, expeditionary

naval forces can conduct or support specialized interdiction operations to regain control as directed.

Port Security

Port security includes the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo

from internal threats such as destruction, loss, injury from sabotage or other subversive acts,

accidents, thefts, or other causes of similar nature.

Port security generally involves the following two major subtasks:

 Defense of critical loading and unloading sites, piers, and container facilities and petroleum,

oils, and lubricants on load/off-load points in a seaport of debarkation, both from seaward and

landward threats.

 Escort of high-value shipping in and out of the port and the handoff to and from the maritime

component commander at sea.

Both subtasks need to be accomplished simultaneously.

Show of Force

Show of force operation are “designed to demonstrate the US resolve that involves increased

visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to

continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.” (JP 1-02) Naval forces

are uniquely suited for show of force operations because of their forward-deployed posture,

self-sustainable capability, and ability to maintain presence offshore indefinitely.

Vessel Escort

Naval forces protect US flagged vessels and US citizens and their property embarked on US or

foreign vessels as well as nearby critical infrastructure from external attack or other unlawful

violence in waters where the United States has jurisdiction. Such protection can take many

forms but is most often accomplished by—

 Employing armed surface vessels or a combination of armed surface vessels and armed aircraft

to enforce a moving security zone or naval vessel protection zone.

 Accompanying a transiting vessel.

 Using armed, embarked security forces.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

4-11

Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure

Visit, board, search, and seizure is the term for “maritime boarding actions and tactics designed

to capture enemy vessels; combat terrorism, piracy, and smuggling; and conduct customs,

safety, and other inspections as employed by modern navies, marine and maritime services, and

military and police forces.” (MCRP 1-10.2) It has evolved over time to include three distinct

actions—the right to visit; the ability to stop, board, and search; and the ability to seize the

vessel and crew if there is jurisdiction and the authority exists.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

A-1

APPENDIX A

STRATEGIC-LEVEL GUIDANCE AND POLICY

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Five, national-level documents describe the strategic framework for US naval forces in maritime

stability operations—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,

National Security Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Military Strategy of

the United States of America, and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

The most recent defense strategic guidance, released by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012,

lists three primary missions for US Armed Forces related to stability operations:

 Provide a stabilizing presence. “U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence

operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training

exercises . . . . However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made

regarding the location and frequency of these operations.”

 Conduct stability and COIN operations. “In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to

address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability

operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and

other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible.”

 Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. “U.S. forces possess rapidly

deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care,

and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending

aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad.”

National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy, released by the President of the United States in 2015, identifies

four enduring American strategic interests:

 The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners.

 A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open, international economic system that

promotes opportunity and prosperity.

 Respect for universal values at home and around the world.

 An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and

opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

A-2

National Strategy for Maritime Security

The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, developed by the Departments of Defense and

Homeland Security, aligns all Federal Government maritime security programs and initiatives into

a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving the appropriate Federal, state, local, and

private sector entities. The National Strategy for Maritime Security includes eight supporting plans

that address the specific threats and challenges of the maritime environment. While the plans address

different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. The

supporting plans include—

 National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness.

 Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan.

 Interim Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan.

 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy.

 Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan.

 Maritime Transportation System Security Plan.

 Maritime Commerce Security Plan.

 Domestic Outreach Plan.

Together, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting plans present

a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate

activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America

The 2015 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, released by the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

 Identifies three national military objectives:

Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.

Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations.

Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.

 Emphasizes that overlapping state and nonstate violence exists in area of conflict where actions

blend techniques, capabilities and resources to achieve their objectives; such hybrid conflicts

serve to increase ambiguity, complicate decisionmaking and slow the coordination of effective

responses.

 Identifies 12 joint force prioritized missions, 6 of which include—

Providing a global, stabilizing presence.

Responding to crises and conducting limited contingency operations.

Conducting military engagement and security cooperation.

Conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations.

Providing support to civil authorities.

Conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

A-3

STABILITY OPERATIONS POLICY

The DOD has issued several policy documents related to stability operations. Collectively, these

documents make clear DOD’s expanded emphasis on stability operations, especially as a method

to build partner capacity. These documents define stability operations and inform the Military

Departments and Services that stability operations shall receive a training priority similar to that

of combat operations.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the

Department of Defense and Its Major Components, dated 21 December 2010

Pursuant to the US Code, Title 10, the Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, was

directed to “develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and organize, train,

and equip, and provide forces, normally employed as combined arms air ground task forces, to

serve as an expeditionary force-in-readiness....” It also identified seven specific functions the

Marine Corps is to perform, the sixth of which directs the Marine Corps to conduct security and

stability operations and assist with the initial establishment of a military government pending

transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, dated 28 August 2014

DODD 3000.07 states that it is DOD’s policy—

 To recognize that irregular warfare (IW) “is as strategically important as traditional warfare

and [DOD] must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW

are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.”

 That DOD conducts IW “independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare. [Irregular

warfare] can include any relevant [DOD] activity and operation such as counterterrorism;

unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations

that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or

territory.”

 That “[DOD] will be proficient in IW.”

Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, of 16 September 2009

DODI 3000.05 states that—

“. . . The Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations

activities to fulfill [DOD] Component responsibilities under national and international law.

Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of

other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments and security forces to ensure that, when

directed, the Department can:

(1) Establish civil security and civil control.

(2) Restore or provide essential services.

(3) Repair critical infrastructure.

(4) Provide humanitarian assistance.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

A-4

“. . . Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability

operations. The Department shall:

(1) Support the stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. Government agencies.

(2) Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and

security forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations,

and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.

(3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of civil-military

teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing

local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and

building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

“. . . The Department shall assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and

security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing

reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include:

(1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.

(2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

(3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.

(4) Fostering economic stability and development.

“. . . The [DOD] Components shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related

concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.”

STABILITY OPERATIONS CONCEPTS

The Marine Corps, through its significant experience in responding to crisis and instability,

has developed a substantial body of conceptual and doctrinal work supporting this doctrinal

publication. A number of joint and Service documents have further guided the development of

this doctrine for MAGTF stability operations including—

 Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept. “This concept

reflects the continued evolution in Department of Defense thinking about future security

challenges and outlines the Department's approach to improving its capabilities and increasing

its capacity for countering irregular threats. . . . [T]he concept probes more deeply into the

nature of these threats and the approach required to address them, to include striking the

appropriate balance between population-focused and enemy-focused action. [It] envisions a

collaborative process by which all agencies synchronize and integrate their activities and

commit to a multinational, multidisciplinary effort to counter irregular threats posed by state

and nonstate adversaries.”

 Naval Operations Concept 2010. This Naval Service concept describes when, where, and how

US naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict, and prevailing in

war. “. . . Readers will quickly discern several themes that collectively embody the essence of

naval service to our Nation. Implicit in these themes is that Sailors, Marines, and Coast

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

A-5

Guardsmen should expect to be engaged in both preventing and winning wars. These themes

reflect the content of [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower] as well as the

guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).”

 Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access . . . Proven Crisis Response.Third

Edition. The premise of this concept is “that sea-based Marines must be organized, trained, and

equipped to engage, respond, and project. In order to meet the Nation’s needs, the Marine

Corps must enhance its ability to engage with a wider set of partners in order to build

capability, forge solid relationships, and promote diplomatic access. At the same time, Marine

Corps forces must remain ready to respond to crises—whether natural or manmade. They must

also be able to project power—either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ as the situation requires—from the sea.

Collectively, these enhancements will expand the Marine Corps’ contribution to preventing

conflict, protecting national interests, and assuring overseas access.”

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-1

APPENDIX B

STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The Stability Assessment Framework is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed

to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal targeting approaches during MAGTF

operations. The Stability Assessment Framework helps Marine and civilian practitioners identify

local grievances and resiliencies and design programs or activities that address sources of

instability and stability and measure their effect in fostering stability.

The Stability Assessment Framework is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool that

reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on understanding and integrating various

perspectives into planning and assessment. The Stability Assessment Framework methodology has

four basic components nested within both the civil affairs methodology and the MCPP. These

components (civil preparation of the battlespace, analysis, design, and execution) complement and

enhance existing planning and execution processes used during civil affairs operations. To the

maximum extent possible, all relevant actors and organizations in the battlespace should be

encouraged to participate in the Stability Assessment Framework process to create comprehensive

efforts while conducting stability operations. Figure B-1, on page B-2, depicts the overall Stability

Assessment Framework methodology, which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-2

Figure B-1. Stability Assessment Framework Methodology.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-3

COMPONENT ONE: CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Civil preparation of the battlespace is the first component of the Stability Assessment Framework.

During civil preparation of the battlespace, planners use the Stability Assessment Framework to

examine the following variables to achieve a heightened understanding of the battlespace:

 Understanding of the operating environment.

 Understanding of the cultural environment.

 Understanding of instability/stability dynamics.

An understanding of the operational area requires research on the physical and tangible

characteristics of the MAGTF’s battlespace. The Stability Assessment Framework civil

preparation of the battlespace process examines three variables to achieve a comprehensive

understanding of the battlespace. The first variable, the operating environment, is analyzed

through civil considerations (ASCOPE) and operational variables (PMESII) and is referred to as

the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method. The ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method facilitates

comprehensive research and organizes information into logical categories for civil information

management (see table B-1 on page B-4). The second variable, cultural environment

considerations is applied to relevant factors derived from ASCOPE-PMESII analysis. The third

variable, instability/stability dynamics, examines relevant factors distilled from the first two steps,

which are derived from identified local grievances and resiliencies. The civil preparation of the

battlespace process is designed to reveal relevant factors that impact stability operations planning

and the MAGTF mission.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-4

Table B-1. ASCOPE-PMESII Analysis.

Political

Military

Economic

Social

Information

Infrastructure

Area

Political areas (district

boundary, party

affiliation areas, etc.)

Military areas (coalition/

LN bases, historic

ambush/IED sites, etc.)

Economic areas

(bazaars, shops,

markets, etc.)

Social area (parks and

other meeting areas)

Radio/TV/news-paper

coverage areas,

other areas where

people gather for

word-of-mouth

Irrigation networks,

water tables, medical

coverage

Structures

Political structures (town

halls, government

offices, etc.)

Military/police buildings

(police HQ, military HHQ

locations, etc.)

Economic structures

(banks, markets,

storage facilities, etc.)

Social structures

(churches, restaurants,

bars, etc.)

Information structures

(cellular/radio/TV

towers, print shops, etc.)

Infrastructure structures

(roads, bridges, power

lines, walls, dams, etc.)

Capabilities

Political

capabilities (dispute

resolution, insurgent

capabilities, etc.)

Military

capabilities (security

posture, strengths/

weaknesses, etc.)

Economic capabilities

(access to banks, ability

to withstand natural

disasters, etc.)

Social capabilities

(strength of local

and national ties)

Information capabilities

(literacy rate,

availability of media/

phone service, etc.)

Infrastructure

capabilities (ability to

build/maintain roads,

walls, dams, etc.)

Organizations

Political organizations

(political parties

and other power

brokers, UN, etc.)

Military organizations

(What units of military,

police, insurgents

are present?)

Economic organizations

(banks, large

landholders, big

businesses, etc.)

Social organizations

(tribes, clans, families,

youth groups, etc., and

NGOs and IGOs)

Information

organizations (news

groups, popular people

who pass the word

[mullahs], etc.)

Infrastructure

organization (govt.

ministries, constructive

companies, etc.)

People

Political people

(governors, councils,

elders, etc.)

Military police (leaders

from coalition, LN, and

insurgent forces, etc.)

Economic people

(bankers, landholders,

wealthy merchants, etc.)

Social people (religious

leaders, influential

families, etc.)

Information people

(media owners, mullahs,

heads of powerful

families, etc.)

Infrastructure people

(builders, contractors,

development

councils, etc.)

Events

Political events

(elections, council

meetings, etc.)

Military events

(lethal events, loss

of leadership,

operations, etc.)

Economic

events (drought,

harvest, business

open/ close, etc.)

Social events (holidays,

weddings, religious

days, etc.)

Information events (IO

campaigns, project

openings, civilian

casualty events, etc.)

Infrastructure events

(road/bridge

construction, well

digging, scheduled

maintenance, etc.)

Legend:

govt

HHQ

IED

government

higher headquarters

headquarter

improvised explosive device

information operations

local national

television

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-5

Understanding the Operating Environment

Unlike a typical ASCOPE-PMESII product, the Stability Assessment Framework does not simply

generate a list of facts about the operating environment; it further analyzes relevant factors as it

relates to local population perceptions and the MAGTF mission. For example, CMO planners

should not simply note there is a local government; they should note it is dominated by a certain

tribal group who will undermine government legitimacy and resist any foreign intervention. Table

B-2 illustrates the Stability Assessment Framework method of compiling ASCOPE-PMESII

relevant factors.

Understanding the Cultural Environment

The analysis of cultural information must consider Marine Corps operational culture tenets (i.e., the

five dimensions of operational culture—physical environment, economy, social structure, political

structure, and belief systems) to determine normal conditions and to ascertain impacts of indigenous

culture on MAGTF operations. This analysis is compared against ASCOPE-PMESII to further

refine relevant factors to potential sources of instabilities or resiliencies. Table B-3, on page B-6,

illustrates the Stability Assessment Framework method of examining cultural considerations as they

relate to ASCOPE-PMESII relevant factors.

Table B-2. Relevant Factors Matrix Example.

Factors Relevance

Low literacy and school attendance due to lack of

schools and teachers

Parents send children to madrasas, resulting

in radicalization

The health director is corrupt, has expanded health

care to only certain tribes

Corruption and preferential treatment presumably

undermines government legitimacy

Settling nomads and returning refugees/IDPs increase

demand on community resources (land, water)

Exacerbates disputes with local communities

Provincial religious leader supports the government,

opposes radical mullahs

Suggests the religious tradition is moderate, not

normally supportive of radical ideology

Poor road network; limited road access to

certain areas

Certain areas are isolated, difficult for CF, government,

and local forces to access, influence, or secure

Governor wants to build a road linking districts with

provincial capital

New road would have mixed effects—improved

access for both security forces and government

smugglers and malign actors

Virtually no public sanitation, water, or electricity Lack of public services probably undermines health

conditions and economic development

Legend:

IDP

coalition forces

internally displaced person

A P

S M

C E

O S

P I

E I

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-6

Table B-3. Cultural Worksheet Matrix.

Physical Environment Economy Social Structure Political Structure Belief Systems

What roles are expected

of Marine personnel

with respect to water

use and provision?

How will Marine

operations impact the

informal economy and the

people in it?

At what age is

someone considered

a child or adult?

How is decisionmaking

organized, and who gets

to make decisions?

What are the pivotal

historical stories that

all people in the

community share?

What kinds of operational

considerations are

influenced by water

or override cultural

aspects of water as a

physical resource?

How does the formal

economy rely upon

the informal economy,

and what abuses of the

AO’s population does

this cause?

How should Marines

prepare to respond to

children that act as

soldiers in militaries or

insurgencies or participate

in violent activities against

US forces?

Who do leaders have to

consult, and to whom

must they answer?

Who are formal

leaders, and what

symbols indicate status?

How are these histories,

folktales, and sayings

used to support

propaganda for or

against Marine and US

activities in the region?

What land in the AO is/is

not appropriate for certain

groups of people to use?

How will Marine

expenditure in the local

informal economy, or

employment of local

informal economic

actors, influence the

socio-economic balance

of power in the AO?

What work, roles,

activities, and spaces are

assigned predominantly to

men and women?

How will alliance with one

group affect Marine

relationships with the

other groups?

Are the heroes or

villains compared to

Marines or Americans?

Legend:

AO area of operations

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-7

Understanding Instability/Stability Dynamics

The Stability Assessment Framework methodology identifies potential instability and stability

factors in the local environment. For example, an instability factor may include grievances

of the local population taken from various data sources and a stability factor may include

resiliencies in the society (institutions and mechanisms that help the society function more

peacefully). Of note, events are considered neutral until they become grievances or resiliencies

for the local population.

Therefore, population surveys are very important endeavors that require careful consideration and

even more vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists

on local perceptions. In the absence of any formulated survey methodology or information, the

tactical conflict survey method may be used to gather initial local perceptions and to validate the

execution of proposed stability activities. The tactical conflict survey is designed to facilitate

initial discussions with locals and to gather local perceptions that will be further analyzed for root

causes of instability/stability. The tactical conflict survey’s four questions are as follows:

 Has the population in the village changed in the last year?

 What is the most important problem facing the village?

 Who do you believe can solve your problems?

 What should be done first to help the village?

All questions should be followed by asking “why” as many times as necessary until a clear

sight picture of local instability/stability dynamics can be determined. This data is compiled

and processed for subsequent targeting decisions but is also maintained in a civil information

management database as baseline information for subsequent analysis on operational

performance and effectiveness. The application of the tactical conflict survey method should

be practiced so that the questions are asked exactly as they are written. The tactical conflict

survey questions should be woven into a normal conversation so that the conduct of a survey

is transparent to the audience. The questions are simple in design but its proper application

supports a scientific research method and facilitates being employed by third parties; i.e.,

interpreters. The initial tactical conflict survey effort should be applied quickly and broadly

throughout the operational area to establish a solid baseline of perception data for subsequent

Stability Assessment Framework analysis and to inform future unit assessment efforts. It is

important to note that subsequent survey questions related to Stability Assessment Framework

efforts will have to be modified as operations progress. This is due to the impact of military

operations on the environment and local expectations evolving over a period of time. The

employment of tactical conflict survey questions in subsequent surveys should be adjusted

to ascertain the impact of operations and should be conducted at logical intervals so that

actual change can occur. The Stability Assessment Framework method does not preclude

conducting surveys beyond initial efforts because subsequent survey efforts become unique

to each operation. However, subsequent survey efforts and questions should follow the same

model of developing simple and exact questions that inform operations being conducted and

can be easily employed by operating forces.

Table B-4 illustrates the Stability Assessment Framework method in compiling this information

for subsequent sources of instability/stability analysis.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-8

COMPONENT TWO: ANALYSIS

After gaining a more complete understanding of the operating environment through civil preparation

of the battlespace, the second component of Stability Assessment Framework methodology analyzes

gathered information to identify sources of instability/stability and establishes desired

objective(s) along with measures of effectiveness that define progress toward addressing each source

of instability/stability.

Examining the three civil preparation of the battlespace variables typically result in producing an

extensive list of factors that could be inciting instability or creating stability. The primary purpose of

analysis is to narrow relevant factors to a lessor number of issues that are indeed actual sources of

instability/stability. Analysis also evaluates and prioritizes the most relevant factors to determine

possible MAGTF objectives that have the most potential for effectively creating stability. To begin

narrowing down the list of relevant factors, the Stability Assessment Framework employs a tactical

form of root cause analysis to examine symptom-cause relationships.

Each source of instability/stability is examined using the source of instability/stability analysis

matrix (see table B-5 on page B-9) and vetted against three instability/stability criteria to ascertain

the potential for establishing effective stability activities. An instability/stability factor resulting in

affirmative responses (i.e., yes responses) are considered viable issues for designing stability

activities that address grievances or resiliencies. The three instability/stability criteria questions

are as follows:

 Question one: Does this issue decrease support for the government or legitimate governance?

Legitimate governance institutions refers to nongovernmental entities that help the society

regulate itself, such as a village elder or tribal council. These criteria can often be considered in

two parts–first, whether locals are upset about the issue and second, if so, whether their

expectations and displeasure are specifically directed toward the government/local leaders.

From a resiliency perspective, does this issue increase support for the government or legitimate

governance? If societal norms need to be maintained for stability then every effort should be

made to protect normal functions.

Table B-4. Instability/Stability Factors Matrix Sample.

Grievances/Vulnerabilities Events Key Actions: Means and Motivation

Civilian casualties

Land disputes

Tribal elders can no longer

solve disputes

Judicial system corrupt, slow

Lack of healthcare

Lack of education

Police incompetence

Police corruption

Poor road infrastructure

Upcoming coalition forces/HN

force operation

National Narcotics

Eradication Program

Nomads settling down

Refugees/internally displaced

persons returning

Governor (involved in timber smuggling)

Deputy police (skims, collects ghost salaries)

Military police chief (protects criminal brother

from prosecution)

Local tribal leader (drug trafficker, militia leader,

works with malign actors)

Education director (corrupt, sells food intended

for school children)

Health director (sells supplies, only looks after

certain tribes)

Warlords, drug smugglers, and malign actors

(undermine formal and informal justice)

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-9

 Question two: Does this issue increase support for malign actors? This usually occurs when

malign actors are either directly addressing the problem (e.g., providing security to a community

that the police never visit) or successfully leveraging the issue with their propaganda. From a

resiliency perspective, does this issue decrease support for malign actors. It is important to closely

examine resiliency issues that resist manipulation by malign actors. These issues can result in

more powerful means of solving stability challenges beyond pursuing activities or reducing the

presence of malign actors.

 Question three: Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? The emphasis is on

local norms, which are usually based on what community members have personally experienced

in the past. For example, if a community never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity

can hardly be undermining the normal functioning of their society. From a resiliency perspective,

does this issue increase institutional and societal capacity and capabilities? This merits careful

consideration in recognizing the importance of supporting or enhancing resiliencies without

disrupting normal functions.

Table B-5. Sources of Instability/Stability Analysis Matrix.

Potential

Sources of

Instability/

Stability

Instability/Stability Criteria SOI Prioritization

Does this issue

decrease support

for the govt/legit

governance?

Explain

Does this issue

increase support

for malign actors?

Explain

Does this issue

disrupt the normal

functioning of

society?

Explain

Does the issue

meet any

instability or

stability criteria?

Is the source of

instability/stability

a priority

grievance or

resiliency for the

local populace?

Does this issue

increase support

for the govt/legit

governance?

Explain

Does this issue

decrease support

for malign actors?

Explain

Does this

issue increase

institutional and

societal capacity

and capability?

Explain

Civilian govt

corruption

Corruption

complaints

directed solely

at police

No evidence that

insurgency

exploits this issue

Locals not

concerned,

apparently within

normal bounds

No No

Insecurity

(including

police and

civcas)

Yes

Civcas, insecurity,

police

ineffectiveness

reflect poorly

on govt

Insurgency are

also blamed

for civcas,

not providing

security either

Yes

Insecurity

and police

problems exceed

local norms

Yes Yes

#1 grievance

Local govt.

arbitrator

Yes

Locals accept

decisions and

increase support

for govt

Yes

The locals want

malign actors

to leave

Yes

An arbitrator is an

accepted form of

governance

Yes Yes

#1 resiliency

Legend:

civcas

govt

legit

SOI

civilian casualties

government

legitimate

source of instability

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-10

The final step on the sources of instability/stability analysis matrix (see table B-5) is to prioritize

the identified sources of instability/stability based on what is most important to the local

population. Information may be available through surveys, polling data, information sharing with

intergovernmental/nongovernmental representatives, HN officials, etc. It is important to note at

this stage of the Stability Assessment Framework, CMO planners may have to make assumptions

as to whether or not the source of instability/stability is a priority for the population and should

seek to validate this assumption at the earliest opportunity through civil reconnaissance. A priority

grievance or resiliency is an issue a significant percentage of locals, not outside experts, identify

as a priority for their community. Otherwise, locals may perceive the stabilization efforts as

focusing on issues that do not really matter to them.

It is very important to note that the sources of instability/stability analysis matrix frames the

potential sources of instability/stability such that affirmative or negative responses should

make sense as they relate to evaluating grievances (i.e., sources of instability) or resiliencies

(i.e., sources of stability). During the design process, activities are developed to mitigate or

protect sources of instability/stability.

Civil-military operations planners should recognize that not every source of instability/stability can

be mitigated or protected through MAGTF organic capabilities or through nonlethal means. Certain

sources of instability/stability may be better mitigated or protected through other approaches that

may include referral to intergovernmental/nongovernmental-sponsored programs, HN actions,

or, in some cases, referred for prosecution by other MAGTF or joint targeting approaches. When

these type issues arise, then CMO planners need to share the results of source of instability/stability

analysis with other MAGTF entities and be prepared to collaborate in separate activities that are

not related to Stability Assessment Framework methodology but are important to achieving overall

MAGTF objectives.

The final step in stability analysis is to complete the instability/stability matrix, part 1 by inserting a

source of instability/stability and then determining an objective with viable effectiveness indicators

and legitimate means to measure progress (the shaded columns). The establishment of objectives

uses the same processes and principles used in the MCPP; therefore, no further elaboration will be

provided other than to remind CMO planners the importance of collaborating with other MAGTF

entities while developing courses of action and employing Stability Assessment Framework

methodology. Table B-6, on page B-11, provides a template for what will be refined further during

the design phase.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-11

COMPONENT THREE: DESIGN

In the next step of Stability Assessment Framework, CMO planners design, prioritize, and integrate

stabilization activities using an activity design worksheet (see table B-7 on page B-12) and

completing the design section of the instability/stability matrix, part 2 (see table B-8 on page B-13).

This process begins by brainstorming potential activities specifically related to issues captured

during previous sources of instability/stability analysis. Potential activities are then screened and

refined using the three stability criteria.

Note: The activity design worksheet frames the potential activities such

that inherently positive aspects of the activity (the positive stability

effect) are highlighted.

The three stability criteria questions are applied to each brainstormed activity to ensure potential

efforts are vetted against previous stability analysis. Once again, the following three stability

criteria questions are applied to ensure maximum impact toward addressing sources of instability/

stability that affect the local population:

 Does this activity increase support for the government or governance?

 Does this activity decrease support for malign actors?

 Does this activity increase institutional and societal capacity and capability?

Proposed activities that meet any stability criteria are then refined using the following eight

design principles:

 Can be sustained by the local government or society.

 Maximizes local involvement to create local ownership.

Table B-6. Instability/Stability Matrix, Part 1.

Analysis

Source of

Instability/Stability

Causes

(Perception)

Causes

(Systemic) Objective

Impact

Indicators

Impact

Data Sources

Taken from source of

instability/stability analysis

The population’s

perception of

this situation

The root causes of

instability/stability; the

conditions that led to

the problem or allow

it to continue; the

conditions that

support stability

Statement of the

conditions that

will diminish or

eliminate the source

of instability or

create conditions

for stability

Also called measures

of effect, impact

indicators reflect

measurable changes

in the environment

that will occur if

systemic causes are

addressed and the

objective is achieved

Information sources

that will allow

you to track the

impact indicators

Design

Activities Output Indicators Output Data Sources

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-12

 Minimizes trade-offs between short-term positive effects and any potentially negative

long-term impacts (i.e., unintended consequences).

 Leverages or supports programs of other government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the

HN government.

 Is appropriate to the local political and cultural context.

 Strengthens governmental accountability and transparency.

 Leverages and builds upon existing societal resiliencies.

 Includes the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change.

It is important to note that activity design does not have to meet all design principles but the

probability of executing a successful activity increases significantly when all design principles

are met.

Table B-7. Activity Design Worksheet.

Stability Criteria

Brainstorm Possible Activities Generate a list of potential activities that will address the

systemic cause and contribute to achieving the objective for a

given source of instability/stability

Does the activity increase support for

government/governance? Explain

Explain how the activity will increase support for the

government and/or legitimate governance institutions

Does the activity decrease support for malign

actors? Explain

Explain how the activity will decrease support for

malign actors

Does the activity increase institutional and

societal capacity and capability? Explain

Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal

capacity and capability

Design Principles

Sustainability For each potential activity meeting one of the stability criteria,

refine the proposed activity to meet as many of the 8 design

principles as possible

Local ownership

Short-term vs. long-term results

Leverage support from other organization

Culturally & politically appropriate

Accountability & transparency

Leverage existing resiliencies

Flexibility

Resources

Money Do you have the resources to support successful execution of

the activity?

Personnel

Expertise

Time

Select

Is activity realistic or should it be done? Based on the stability criteria, design principles, and resource

availability, should the activity be implemented?

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-13

The next design step is to screen each proposed activity against available resources, time, money,

personnel, and expertise and determine whether the activity is realistic or even meets the

parameters of the MAGTF’s mission. If the activity meets acceptable parameters for final

consideration, then the instability/stability matrix design section is completed and processed for

final validation as a legitimate nonlethal stability targeting package.

The final step in design is to validate the activity identified in the instability/stability matrix, part 2

as a viable stability nonlethal target. This validation occurs through civil reconnaissance and civil

engagement. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement examines actual local conditions to ensure

planning assumptions were not corrupt or misguided. At this juncture, it is critical to implement

stability nonlethal targeting efforts predicated on a thorough understanding of local conditions,

local grievances, and local norms, not outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained

through civil reconnaissance or other mechanisms including population surveys, focus groups, key

leader engagements, input from local NGOs, etc.

During this final step prior to the execution phase, activities are validated, prioritized, and

synchronized with overall MAGTF efforts. If an activity is not validated through civil

reconnaissance or from any other circumstances, then the activity is deemed untenable and

must be revalidated though civil preparation of the battlespace and the entire process again.

If an activity is validated, the information in the instability/stability matrix, part 2 is forwarded

through the operations department as a nonlethal targeting package, and the initial transition

criteria are established until they are further refined during monitoring and evaluation efforts

in the next phase.

Table B-8. Instability/Stability Matrix, Part 2.

Analysis

Source of Instability

Causes

(Perception)

Causes

(Systemic) Objective

Impact

Indicators

Impact

Data Sources

Taken from sources of

instability/stability analysis

Population’s

perception of

this situation

The root causes of

instability/stability;

the conditions that

led to the problem

or allow it to

continue; the

conditions that

support stability

Statement of the

conditions that will

diminish or

eliminate the SOI

source of instability

or create conditions

for stability

Also called

“measures of

effect,” impact

indicators reflect

measurable

changes in the

environment that

will occur if

systemic causes

are addressed and

the objective is

achieved

Information

sources that

will allow you

to track the

impact indicators

Design

Activities Output Indicators Output Data Sources

The things you will do to address systemic

causes of instability/stability and achieve

the identified objective

Also called measures of performance,

output indicators simply measure

progress toward the completion of

an activity

Information sources that will allow you

to track the output indicators

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-14

COMPONENT FOUR: EXECUTION

The execution phase consists of delivering the nonlethal targeting package (i.e., instability/stability

matrix, part 2) to the operations department, conducting monitoring and evaluation on an approved

nonlethal targeting package, and conducting transition to competent authorities (event driven) or

conducting closing actions at the conclusion of operations (time driven).

The first step of this phase is simply finalizing the nonlethal target package so that is becomes part

of the MAGTF operational effort.

Next, and most significant, is the establishment of an iterative cycle of examination that eventually

leads to the accomplishment of objectives or the termination of activities because they fail to achieve

desired effects. Monitoring and evaluation is basically conducted on the following three levels:

measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and overall stability.

Measures of performance simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question,

“Is the activity progressing?” and in the long run “Is the activity complete?” Examples might

include the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Measures of performance

are monitored during the implementation of an activity until it is completed.

Measures of effectiveness measure an activity’s impact. Examples might be decreased travel time

(for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are

generally evaluated after an activity is completed.

Overall stability measures the effect of individual activities, it takes into account the effect of

all activities conducted over a longer period of time, as well as the influence of external factors.

It asks, “Is stability increasing or decreasing?” Key to measuring overall stability is identifying

good indicators, creating a baseline, and then tracking the indicators at regular intervals, starting

as early as possible. The best overall stability indicators reflect local perceptions of stability,

not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, “What will

local people do or say differently if they believe the environment is getting more stable?”

Examples include—

 District government recognition; e.g., locals take their problems to the district government for

resolution—reflects trust and confidence.

 Local-on-local violence–a direct measure of insecurity.

 Population freedom of movement–reflects security conditions.

A single indicator is incapable of measuring overall stability. Stability indicators normally

aggregate to build a complete sight picture. Therefore, stability planners must not only establish

and track metrics methodically to inform progress but also maintain an iterative process of

stability activity refinement. The monitoring and evaluation matrix in table B-9, on page B-15,

provides a mechanism and tool for capturing progress and evaluating overall stability.

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

B-15

The final step of the entire Stability Assessment Framework process is to transition operations and

to redeploy MAGTF assets to other contingencies or back to continental United States for retrofit

and reassignment. As alluded to earlier, initial transition criteria are established when activities are

submitted for implementation; however, more definitive transition criteria will be established as

operations progress. The monitoring and evaluation process determines most realistic

circumstances based on progress and overall MAGTF transition criteria.

Table B-9. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix.

Measure of Performance

SOI Activity MOP Indicator Status

Ineffective justice system Technical training for justice

officials

Number of officials trained Status of selected activity

Lack of legitimate conflict

resolution mechanism

Establish mobile dispute unit Mobile dispute unit hears

a case

Status of selected activity

Lack of local police protection

at local tribal meetings

Local police establish

secure meeting environments

for Jirgas

Local police provide security

IAW planning

Status of selected activity

Measure of Effect

MOE Indicator Baseline Change Objective

Increased number of disputes

resolved by government-

recognized entities

Average 3 cases resolved by

courts, 10 Jirgas per month

Change in baseline data Effective justice system

Decreased number of disputes

resolved by malign actors

Average 20 cases resolved by

malign actors per month

Change in baseline data Population supports conflict

resolution mechanisms linked

to government

Decreased violence linked

to local tribal meetings

Average 3 deaths or injuries

linked to local tribal meetings

per month

Change in baseline data

Legend:

IAW

MOE

MOP

SOI

in accordance with

measurement of effectiveness

measure of performance

source of instability

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-1

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASCOPE ...................................... areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

CMO ...........................................................................................................civil-military operations

COA ......................................................................................................................... course of action

COIN.................................................................................................................... counterinsurgency

DC.......................................................................................................................dislocated civilians

DOD............................................................................................................. Department of Defense

DODD........................................................................................... Department of Defense directive

DODI ......................................................................................... Department of Defense instruction

DOS .................................................................................................................. Department of State

FHA ................................................................................................foreign humanitarian assistance

GCC ........................................................................................... geographic combatant commander

GOPLAT.................................................................................................................. gas-oil platform

HN....................................................................................................................................host nation

ICAF ......................................................................... Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

IGO ................................................................................................. intergovernmental organization

IW ...........................................................................................................................irregular warfare

JFC ................................................................................................................ joint force commander

JP............................................................................................................................. joint publication

JTF .............................................................................................................................joint task force

LOSC .....................................................................................................Law of the Sea Convention

MAGTF ...............................................................................................Marine air-ground task force

MCPP.............................................................................................. Marine Corps Planning Process

MCTP...........................................................................................Marine Corps tactical publication

MCWP ..................................................................................Marine Corps warfighting publication

NGO..................................................................................................nongovernmental organization

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-2

OCONUS ................................................................................outside the continental United States

PMESII ..................................political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

UN............................................................................................................................. United Nations

US ................................................................................................................................ United States

USAID .......................................................... United States Agency for International Development

USCG...................................................................................................... United States Coast Guard

USG ........................................................................................................ United States Government

WMD .................................................................................................. weapons of mass destruction

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-3

Section II: Terms and Definitions

afloat forward staging base—A modular, cost-effective and capable commercial conversion

solution that meets Marine Corps requirements for aviation, roll-on/roll-off, and dry cargo

prepositioning, amphibious operations, command and control, communications system, medical,

safety/survivability, and personnel accommodation. Also called AFSB. (MCRP 1-10.2)

antipiracy operation—Action to thwart an illegal act of violence, depredation (i.e., plundering,

robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by

the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against

persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. (MCRP 1-10.2)

assessment—1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint

force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward

accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security,

effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the

motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.”

(JP 1-02)

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained,

and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military

operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations—Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that

enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational

environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or

involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil

government. Also called CAO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations—Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or

other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military

forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of

objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host

nation. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs,

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United

States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental

agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

combating terrorism—Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose

terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (JP 1-02)

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-4

counterpiracy operation—Action taken in response to an illegal act of violence, depredation

(i.e., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for

private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft

or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. (MCRP 1-10.2)

counterterrorism—Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their

organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and

coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team—The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed

by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each

represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States

diplomatic mission. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a

displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless

person. Also called DC. (JP 1-02)

exclusion zone—A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a

specific geographic area in order to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet

the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of

force. (JP 1-02)

explosive ordnance—All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials,

and biological and chemical agents. (JP 1-02)

explosive ordnance disposal—The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe,

recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. Also called EOD. (JP 1-02)

explosive ordnance disposal procedures—Those particular courses or modes of action taken

by explosive ordnance disposal personnel for access to, diagnosis, rendering safe, recovery,

and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any hazardous material associated with an

explosive ordnance incident. (MCRP 1-10.2)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the

United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger,

or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any

of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its

security. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

governance—The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior

by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society,

including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under

inclusive, constitutional authority. (JP 1-02)

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-5

instruments of national power—All of the means available to the government in its pursuit

of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.

(JP 1-02)

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including

the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination—Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US

Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement between two

or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national

interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

interorganizational coordination—The interaction that occurs among elements of the

Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local,

and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental

organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 1-02)

irregular warfare—A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and

influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

littoral—The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 1. Seaward: the

area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore.

2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from

the sea. (JP 1-02)

Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought

processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military

operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy

of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the

establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem framing, course of

action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders

development, and transition. Also called MCPP. (MCRP 1-10.2)

maritime domain—The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace

above these, including the littorals. (JP 1-02)

maritime interception operations—Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in

international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United

Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. Also called

MIO. (JP 1-02)

MCWP 3-03 Stability Operations

Glossary-6

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic

development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or

encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.

(JP 1-02)

operational area—An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of

responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which military operations are

conducted. Also called OA. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation—All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop

allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide

US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. (JP 1-02)

security force assistance—The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action

by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign

security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (JP 1-02)

show of force—An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased

visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to

continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (JP 1-02)

stability operations—An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and

activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national

power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

unexploded explosive ordnance—Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed or

otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed

in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and

remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also called UXO.